ASIAN REVIEW
2015

Vol. 28, No. 2

Institute of Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University

National Library of Thailand Cataloguing in Publication Data
Chulalongkorn University, Institute of Asian Studies
Asian Review 2015. Bangkok
Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2015.
128 p.
I Asians.

Contents

Introduction

As an interdisciplinary journal, *Asian Review* Vol. 28/2 (2015) contains five important research articles from a wide range of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Through this journal, the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, intends to promote an understanding of contemporary Asia. The papers in the current issue emphasize ethnicity, cultural studies, development, foreign affairs, administrative management, health care, economics, people's movement, language, politics and religion.

The first article offers an analysis and description of the causes for the conflict between the Thai government and separatist movements. This article explains the impact of the insurgent movement in the Deep South on both the locals and the nation at large. This is an in-depth analysis of the situation, with thoughtful indication for a potential way out of the situation.

The second article analyses the access to healthcare in communities in the border areas of Tak Province, Thailand, and in neighboring districts of Myanmar. It describes the conflict, displacement and institutional neglect that have left this region of Eastern Myanmar without functioning public-health services. Delivering healthcare services to people on the move has been a challenge. Thi s paper presents two short case studies that describe how a network prioritizes access to basic care at the village level, with ethnic and community organiza-tions training oddslot village health workers to provide health education and to manage common diseases.

The third article focuses on the Sino-Mekong relationship, especially in the field of economic cooperation and new migration. It is based on findings from fieldwork in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), and argues that new waves of Chinese migration are an integral part of China's capital flow of investment, trade and economic aid. It suggests that it is important for CLMV countries

Asian Review 28(2), 2015, pp. 1–2.

to establish a legal channel of recruitment for immigrant workers to ensure bilateral and inter-state cooperation on labor migration management.

The fourth article examines the influence of architectural characteristics from the Thai Hóa palace in the royal citadel on the main shrine of Hué temple. It is based on field survey with case studies of square enclosure temples (Khau □) in Hué city, illustrating affinities between the Thai Hóa palace and the temples. The paper argues that the royal palace has influenced the architectural characteristics of Hué's traditional temples which are part of Hué's cultural heritage today.

Finally, the fifth article examines Thai doctoral dissertations in Public Administration, reviewing 155 doctoral dissertations completed between 2005 and 2012 from the Thai Library Integrated System (ThaiLIS) database. It suggests that the Thai-language doctoral curriculum in Public Administration is relatively new as the oldest documented doctoral dissertation dates to 2005.

This issue of *Asian Review* also contains two book reviews. The first is a critical analysis of *The Idea of Justice* by the Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen. In his thought-provoking book, Sen discusses, among other topics, how to address and alleviate practical issues of injustice, rather than pursuing questions about the nature of perfect justice.

Also centered on justice, the second review discusses *Global Rectificatory Justice*, by Göran Collste, Professor of Applied Ethics at Linköping University, Sweden. The book falls under the banner of "global justice," a growing field in applied and political ethics, and provides a panoramic view of the extensive literature on the current preoccupation with an honest and objective scrutiny of our collective past and wrongs committed by colonizing countries.

The construction and development of Public Administration knowledge: A state-of-the-art review of Thai doctoral dissertations

Pratumtip Thongcharoen and Chokchai Suttawet

Abstract—A review of 155 doctoral dissertations in Public Administration (PA) reveals the newness of the doctoral curriculum as the oldest dissertation found in the database dates to 2005. Ramkhamhaeng University has the largest number of PA doctoral dissertations. The New Public Management paradigm was the most popular paradigm, found in all PA subfields. The classic theories and contingency theories were the most popular. The qualitative method was mostly used. The trend of using mixed methods has increased in popularity in recent years. Innovation was encountered in terms of a relationship among the PA sub-fields and outside PA but this was counterbalanced by a significant problem represented by the scarcity of doctoral dissertations in the Thai PA curricula.

Keywords: public administration; state-of-the-art review; knowledge; construction; development

Introduction

Public Administration (PA) has had a long evolution since attempts were made to separate politics from administration in 1900-1926 (Henry, 2006). In 1887, the American academic and politician Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) published "The study of administration," an article widely considered as a foundation study on PA (Ketsuwan, 2011: 28). Subsequently, PA grew in importance and has continued to generate scholarship.

Internationally PA is still considered a relatively new discipline. In Thailand, PA was used for the first time in 1899, a little over ten

years after Woodrow Wilson's seminal publication, at the Civil Service College during the reign of King Rama V (r. 1873-1910). Numerous higher education institutions offered PA studies at bachelor and master degree levels, while a doctoral degree became available only around ten years ago. PA doctoral dissertations came to be acknowledged by the Thai Library Integrated System (ThaiLIS)—a new central and formal database of the Thai academic community—for the first time in 2005.

Among Thai universities, the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), established in 1966, and Ramkhamhaeng University, established in 1971, are known for their PA doctoral degree courses (Laohavichien, 1987). This is the first study of PA doctoral dissertations, using the ThaiLIS database in a "holistic" way. There may have been PA dissertations prior to 2005 but they were not recorded in ThaiLIS and therefore fall outside the scope of this study. This has an advantage in that it helps to predict the trend in PA studies but also in its implementation in the future, including providing suggestions to stakeholders such as policy makers, and scholars to construct and develop PA to its full potential. As stated earlier, the objectives of this study are: 1) to trace the construction and development of PA knowledge in Thai doctoral dissertations; 2) to examine the paradigms, theories, methodologies and innovations in PA dissertations; 3) and to analyze the problems of PA that appeared in doctoral dissertations.

"Construction" and "development" are crucial words in this study. *Construction* is defined by the Oxford Dictionary (2014) as building or making something, typically a large structure. However, in social sciences, the word is used in forms such as "Constructing Social Theories" (Stinchcombe, 1987) to refer to the creation of theory and the explanation of social phenomena. "Construction of knowledge" means the creation of new knowledge, a usage similar to the epistemology of metaphysics, in which construction is similar to the formation and formulation in the first step of policy processes. Stoll et al. (2003: 24-25) stated that "the construction of knowledge is a dynamic, active process in which learners constantly strive to make sense of new information."

Development is defined by the Oxford Dictionary (2014a) as: 1) a specified state of growth or advancement; 2) a new and advanced product or idea: 3) an event constituting a new stage in a changing situation; 4) the process of starting to be affected by an ailment or

feeling; 5) the process of treating photographic film with chemicals to make a visible image; 6) in chess playing, the process of bringing one's pieces into play in the opening phase of a game. Development is very closely related to creativity and innovation, which continues from the construction of knowledge as mentioned above.

This study focus on three aspects of PA studies: 1) subject matter, including paradigms, theories, methodologies, innovations, problems and possible ways for solving problems; 2) places and sources, covering Thai higher education institutions, both public and private.; and 3) time, divided into two periods: doctoral dissertations between 1982 and 2012, and data from national or international conferences on PA between 2011 and 2014.

The study is limited to the Thai PA curriculum. NIDA has offered an international PA curriculum for more than 20 years, and uploaded its first PA-related doctoral dissertation in 2005. Since 20l0, an international curriculum has been offered at the College of Local Administration (COLA), Khon Kaen University, and produced one graduate in 2014. Dissertations emerging from the international curriculum are outside the scope of the study. Most doctoral students on the international curricula are from overseas but with a sizeable contingent of Thai nationals. For their research topics, overseas students tend to choose an issue related to their country of origin rather than Thailand.

Thai institutions usually offer both Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) and Doctor of Public Administration (DPA) degrees. This differs from the convention in other ASEAN member states, such as Malaysia, which offer only the PhD type (see Appendix for more details).

Method

This study uses mixed methods (Creswell and Plano, 2011) to categorize quantitative research and qualitative research. Firstly, qualitative research was employed to find the best data source from ThaiLIS and it was found that doctoral dissertations were a suitable source to study. Secondly, quantitative research was used to survey a population of 155 doctoral dissertations in PA between 2005 and 2012 using "state-of-the-art review" techniques (Suttawet, 2009). Though there are many ways to categorize PA into subfields, this research uses the five PA subfields of Shafritz and Hyde (2007). Thirdly, qualitative research was applied on the results to verify their completeness, through triangula-

tion of data and in-depth interviews with PA experts (one expert in each subfield).

Student background, institutions, and subfields

Male students had greater interest to study doctoral degrees in PA, reflecting a traditional aspect of Thai society. Of the 155 dissertations, 101 were authored by males and 54 by females (Table 1), However, female members of the Thai population now have access to greater opportunities, including positions of leadership such as prime minister or corporate chief executives. In a democratic society, women's rights have blossomed.

The 155 dissertations originated from seven higher education institutions, listed in Table 1. Ramkhamhaeng University accounted for 100 dissertations (65 percent) followed by the NIDA with 27 dissertations (17 percent). These results reflect the strength of the PA curricula at NIDA and Ramkhamhaeng.

Table 1 Number and Proportion of Thai doctoral dissertations in Public Administration, 2005-2012

Institution	Number	Percentage
Burapha University	8	5%
Eastern Asia University	1	1%
NIDA	27	17%
Ramkhamhaeng University	100	65%
Suan Dusit Rajabhat University	16	10%
Surin Rajabhat University	1	1%
Ubon Ratchathani University	2	1%
Total	155	100%

Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, established in 1917 and 1934 respectively, aim to be leaders in political science and PA. Ramkhamhaeng University and NIDA, established later than Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities, have specialized in

offering doctoral degrees in PA. NIDA has offered PA in both Thai and international curricula at graduate level, while Ramkhamhaeng University has offered only Thai PA curriculum at both undergraduate and graduate level. Other universities, such as Surin Rajabhat University, Eastern Asia University, or Ubon Ratchathani University, are newly-established in the field, and may become more prominent in the future.

Researchers' professional profiles were studied through the résumé or bio-data in the final section of each doctoral dissertation, along with various career data (most are civil servants) available at various internet sources. Instructors in higher education institutions see a PA qualification as valuable for their prospects for promotion or for employment in other organizations. Another 35 percent were chief executives in both public and private organizations, where PA knowledge and skills is relevant to management. Politicians accounted for less than 5 percent, and the remaining 10 percent came from miscellaneous career backgrounds. The number of doctoral dissertations per year increased by nearly 70 percent between 2007 and 2011. This is consistent with the findings by Yavaprapas and Whangmahaporn (2012: 3).

In terms of subfield, the highest proportion was in organizational theory (40 percent), followed by policy analysis (22.6 percent), ethics (14.8 percent), human resource management (HRM) (15.5 percent), public budgeting (5.2 percent), and the PA curriculum (1.9 percent) (see Table 2). The highest number of dissertations on HRM (12 titles) was recorded in 2009, while 2007 and 2010 were the most popular years for studies in organizational theory, with 17 and 19 titles respectively. The number of dissertations on ethics decreased in later years.

The three major methodologies are Qualitative Research (67 titles), Mixed Methods (41 titles) and Quantitative Research (33 titles) (see Table 3). Non-experimental Research accounted for three titles, respectively by Laohapakdee (2008), Kanjananont (2010), and Prasungsit (2007), concerned with public budgeting. According to Dulyakasem (1993: 117-162), some scholars classify Survey Research (11 titles) under Quantitative Research, hence the Quantitative Research figure may include some dissertations using Survey Research methodology.

Table 2 Proportion of PA subfields and PA curriculums compared by year, 2005-2011.

PA subfields & curriculums	Number of doctoral dissertations, by year							
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Tot.
1. PA curriculum	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	3
2. Public budgeting	-	-	2	2	2	2	-	8
3. Ethics	-		7	7	7	1	1	23
4. HRM	-	2	5	2	12	2	1	24
5. Policy analysis	2	9	8	3	5	8	-	35
6. Org. theory	1	9	17	11	5	19	-	62
Total	3	20	40	25	32	33	2	155

Table 3 Proportion of PA subfields and PA curricula compared with types of methodologies.

	Types of Methodologies					
PA subfields & curriculums	Qual.	Quant.	Mixed Methods	Survey Res.	Non-exper. Res.	Total
1. PA curriculum	3	-	-	-		3
2. Public budgeting	2	3	-	-	3	8
3. Ethics	10	-	4	9	-	23
4. HRM	4	11	7	2	-	24
5. Policy analysis	20	3	12	-	-	35
6. Org. theory	28	16	18	-	-	62
Total	67	33	41	11	3	155

Paradigms, theories and methods

The paradigms used in these dissertations may be into six major strands: 1) NPM (New Public Management) paradigm, including consumer protection, managerial values, efficiency, effective strategy and management; 2) democracy paradigm, focusing on participation, commitment, public network and civil society; 3) HRM paradigm, focusing on leadership, the "quality of work," reward system, retention, human resources development (HRD), welfare, trust, attitudes and employee and entrepreneurship; 4) governance paradigm, covering ethical behavior and conflict; 5) postmodern paradigm, covering topics such as gender equality, feminine leadership, special abilities and innovative leaders; 6) policy processes paradigm, covering formation, decision-making, implementation, enforcement, evaluation and assessment. The NPM paradigm was the most popular and was found in all PA subfields.

The theories used were related to the paradigms and the titles, especially, Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA), Total Quality Management (TQM), Thailand International Public Sector Standard, Management System and Outcome (PSO) and Results-Based Management (RBM). Classical theory, such as top-down analysis, elite model and institutional model, group theory, system theory, organization behavior and case study were popular tools in all PA subfields. Furthermore, there were some alternative theories, including Buddhist economics, grounded theory, learning theory, psychology theory, strategic management, balance scorecard, key performance indicator (KPI), 360 degree evaluation and empowerment, innovative leader model, Thaworn Kietchaiyakorn's SEDMAR-GNH1 Model and the "happiest cities" model used for developing students' skills at the Nakhon Sawan Vocational Education College. "Contingency theory" was widely used to explaining various situations in both the modern and the postmodern eras.

The choice of methodology also depended on subject. Documentary research, in-depth interview specific to key-informants and focus groups figure strongly in qualitative Research. Special approaches were used to collect data such as EDFR (ethnographic delphi futures research). The data were subsequently analyzed with "analytical description." "quantitative research"and survey research"were also found in

some PA doctoral dissertations. Particularly, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is a popular program for analyzing quantitative research data, especially descriptive statistics such as percentile, mean and standard deviation. Higher levels of analysis with inferential statistics were processed with the help of T-test, F-test, stepwise, multiple regression, simple correlation analysis, the standard regression coefficient, Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient PPMCC or PCC, Scheffe's test, chi-square test, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), multivariate analysis of variance or multiple analysis of variance MANOVA, multivariate analysis of covariance MANCOVA, factor analysis, path analysis, including path coefficient from the structure equation model (SEM) with Amos program, and linear structural relationship model were used for analyses in "quantitative research." "time series analysis" was used in long-term studies. the use of "mixed methods" seems to have increased.

Innovation is associated with "change", or the introduction of ideas, methods, products, invention, actions, activities, processes or "new-order things". None of the dissertations had used the holistic or state-of-the-art review. Some made use of new databases such as the ThaiLIS, for data searches and for finding articles and theses to support research. Only a small number of dissertations focused on the PA curriculum.

Public budgeting is closely related to economics, while ethics has marked affinities with human resource management. Moreover, ethics is close to all subjects but also to all PA subfields. "Public debt" has not been the subject of any dissertation. Most dissertations referred to "school of thoughts". Lastly, "postmodern paradigm" appeared in some doctoral dissertations in Policy Analysis on such topics as "gender equality," "female empowerment," and "women executives."

Problems

Each PA subfield has its unique problems. For example, the Thai PA curriculum has been the subject of only two percent of PA doctoral dissertations. Public debt has not been studied even though it is a major part of public budgeting. Ten other problems of government's public administration were found, as follows:

1. interference by politicians in the mechanics and working processes of different public organizations, which impacted on independent entities' freedoms of decision-making;
2. a lack of devolution of tasks, manpower, budgeting and law from central to local government agencies;
3. absence of collaboration among public sectors, private sectors and citizens;
4. the possible suppression of some beneficial data, including "adverse selection" of government officers;
5. the perception of improper behavior on the part of the committee charged with monitoring rules and regulations for ethical principles;
6. the perception of miscommunications from public relations bodies to people in different communities, and particularly those in remote locations, including the dissemination of information leading to conflict with public enterprises;
7. government officers limited in their creativity to innovate, due to cumbersome administration with its strict rules and regulations;
8. a lack of balance between the environment and economic growth, including environmental problems such as sewage, municipal solid waste and industrial waste, which affect the community as a whole;
9. susceptibility of government officers to inducements and advantages from dubious sources, including from businessmen occupying political positions which allegedly bring them into conflict with corporate ethics;
10. excessive discretionary powers held by executives in public organizations.

In the field of PA study, there are issues of "quality and quantity"and "demand and supply." What are the suitable numbers of doctoral students per academic year, given the capacity for teaching and management in each teaching institution? Most Thai scholars are anxious about the quality of teaching in these institutions, and its implications on the supply and demand of PhD scholars, and HRM in the long term. Is there an abundance of PhD graduates of insufficient caliber? Stakeholders such as the universities and the committees

in charge of doctoral programs play an important role in balancing the output of PhD students in line with the labor market. Corruption is evident in new and rising practices, including "adverse selection." Thaisanguanvorakul (2009) argues that people are insufficiently aware of corruption, despite the seriousness of the issue in Thailand for a number of years.

Conclusion and suggestions

At present, PA in Thailand is still popular as it has been demonstrated to provide good prospects in a choice of career paths. Importantly, higher education institutions and the Public Administration Association of Thailand (PAAT), including schools of thought and "think-tanks", also exercise influence for integrating Thai PA contexts as a way of developing the body of knowledge, including studying and teaching management with "efficiency"and "effectiveness" within NPM paradigm and theories in knowledge-based society (KBS). However, Horie (2014), from the Japanese National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), has stated that public management has grown over the past 30 years and the dominance of Anglosphere Public Administration is ending (Pollitt, 2014). Therefore, PA needs to adapt outside the Anglosphere such as in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) specifically to different contexts, side-effects and productivity of government departments. For this reason, Bowornwathana (2008: 84-85) provides seven suggestions aimed at boosting Thai PA scholars' skills at international fora:

1. write academic and research articles for publication in the international press;
2. attend conferences, seminars and workshops at overseas institutions;
3. develop sufficient knowledge and capacity to deliver lectures at overseas institutions;
4. follow developments in the world of academia;
5. intensify academic tasks to advance an institution's international exposure;
6. apply strict controls to the granting of doctoral degrees by Thai universities;

7. instigate a good understanding of the difference between the academic sphere and business world.

According to Boonton Dockthaisong,[2] competent PA scholars are best advised to follow these four pieces of advice after graduation, namely:

1. respect all higher education institutions as equal;
2. respect others as we respect ourselves, showing deference equally to our seniors for their advanced knowledge but also to the younger generation for their skill in technology;
3. be kind and courteous to everybody;
4. do not be afraid to employ wisdom as part of problem-solving.

Human Resources are central to organizations, normally driven by leaders who are proactive in public service delivery. Talented and innovative leaders are needed by all organizations, not only to increase productivity and steer organizations to overcome challenges and obstacles, but also to function as effective mentors to younger generations. Tin Pratchayaphrut emphasized the vision of leaders during an in-depth interview in July 2014.

Walker[3] (2013) argues that the "dragon" is a good model for leaders in international education, not only theoretically and practically, but also technically (e-governments) and methodologically, for their ability to adapt to environmental changes. Administrations can minimize expenses by using social networks for some of their communications. Leaders should also heed the warning in a popular English proverb ("Jack of all trades and master of none"), where professionals are advised to seek specialization through continuous upgrading of their skills.

In the postmodern era, female leaders are in positions of power, including as prime ministers and presidents. Governments should extend the retirement age for some professions to 65 or 70 years as people are living longer lives in Thailand, which is fast becoming an ageing society (IPSR, 2014). "Competency-based learning" should also be used for the development of middle-rank executives. These are very important for all processes of HRM as preparation for the demographic change which will affect the allocation and distribution of

resources with equality and equity to populations with different social statuses and locations, amenable to the elemental needs of people for well-being with a life-work balance. Another question concerns an optimum point of resource allocation between profit maximization in private organizations and public organizations, including the quality and quantity of doctoral students, as related to the demand and supply of research degrees in PA curricula. Moreover, since elements of malpractice were encountered in a number of PA subfields, it is pertinent to ask how stakeholders can manage this sustainably. For this reason, higher education institutions and "think-tanks" should undertake more research to find innovative solutions to garner financial support by governments and non-government organizations.

Although Thailand has implemented decentralization for several decades, since 1997 the governments and stakeholders have struggled to allocate resources and implement effective rulings linked to budgeting, manpower, laws and obligations. This is especially the case for budgeting, which aimed to provide local administrations with 35 percent of annual allocations since 2006, a proportion still below the standard line (Chulalongkorn University and the Prime Minister's Office, 2014). Decentralization is important for responding to the needs of people in different areas since "one size does not fit all," as the popular adage goes. Meanwhile, participating in community fora as community engagement and as watchdogs, to investigate and monitor government expenditure and activities, are essential for the workings of democracy in our era. This is combined with self-government in various communities, associated with the "sufficiency economy" philosophy promoted by the current monarch, King Rama IX (H.M. King Bhumibol Adulyadej), and the social theory principles of "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft," generally translated as "community" and "society," an ideal type of social organization promoted by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), (Tönnies, 1955). These are some of the ways in which Public Administration can be built and developed in urban and rural areas for long-term sustainability.

For the future of PA, the researchers hope to incorporate the seven elements discussed in the *Public Administration Review* (Vol.70, 2010) into the development of paradigm, theory and methodology in the future.

The paradigm overlaps with the modern era and postmodern, as

explained by Riccucci (2010: s304-s306). In terms of theory, Wise (2010: s164-s166) contends that future organizations will be characterized by greater hybridization. In methodology, meanwhile, Sanjeev and Thomas (2010: s104) favor a platinum standard for evidence-based assessment by 2020, with assessment based on two experimental methods, where the choice of method is more inclusive, practical and relevant.

However, for five PA subfields, Joyce and Pattison (2010: s24-s32) have posed a challenging question about public budgeting in 2020, whether it returns to equilibrium or continues as a mismatch between demands and resources availability. It is difficult to know what to make of an assignment that tries to anticipate the state of public budgeting several years from now, including details of expenditure for growth and on education. Hence, for a brighter 2020, the governments may struggle to control deficits and debt, unless there are dramatic and painful changes in revenues and expenditures that put the country on a more fiscally sustainable path. For HRM, Wolf and Amirkhanyan (2010: s15-s17) address demographic change. They consider the potential impacts of population change on the scope, structure and functions of state and local governments. The demographic trends are likely to influence not only the mix of services provided, but also their design. Moreover, Getha-Taylor (2010: s170-s171) argues that, while technological advances will allow unprecedented learning and interconnectedness, these advances challenge governments' already limited capacity for responsiveness to the needs of employees and citizens. For this reason, future managers need to consider both the utility and the constraints of the most viable tools and practices.

In terms of ethics, Johnston (2010: s122-s123) contends that the key to envisioning a healthy governance infrastructure, today and into the future, is to frame the challenges of governance appropriately—including the use of online communities, innovative business, nonprofit organizations and governments—to demonstrate the challenges and possibilities of new governance infrastructures that retrofit and complement existing governance infrastructures. As regards policy analysis, most scholars specifically address strategic planning and strategic management, especially balanced scorecards, as illustrated by Jennings (2010: s224-s225), since it is generally argued that measurement shapes behavior.

It remains to be seen whether we are on course as regards planning. We are aware that numerous plans do not incorporate a balanced scorecard approach. Other areas of focus often missing are the responsibilities attaching to public agencies. Regarding organizational theory, Berry (2010: s153-s155) is specific about community engagement of organizations, while "greater hybridization is coming" is the point of organization in the future as argued by Wise (2010: s164-s166), including electronic systems both intranet and internet as e-governments will increasingly be needed in different publi organizations (Norris 2010: s180-s181).

Finally, sustainability, equilibrium, shared-power world, community engagement, e-government, strategic planning, governance and back-to-basics, combined with a globalized world and globalized research as explained by Moloney and Gulrajani (2010: s298-s299), are also important to drive PA among other environment changes.

Appendix

In 2013, Pratumtip Thongcharoen conducted a site visit and attended a research exchange program at the Universiti Sains Malaysia. During the visit, the researcher had an opportunity to interview Prof. Dr. Ahmad Atory Hussain on the topic of the PA curriculum in Malaysia. In Malaysia, PA was placed under the umbrella of Political Science because, in Malaysian higher education, PA is seen in the role and status of "implementation,"as discussed by Wilson (1887). Malaysian scholars tend to view Political Science as "science," though PA is a separate entity from Political Science, as mentioned in the first paradigm by Henry (2006). Although Malaysia is equipped with numerous universities, including internationally recognized institutions, a few of these seats of learning now offer PA doctoral degrees, including the University of Malaya (UM), Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) and the University of Mara. Furthermore, all universities in Malaysia provide doctoral degrees (PhDs), while in Thailand there are various types of doctorates such as Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, Doctor of Public Administration (Public Policy & Public Management), Doctor of Public Administration, Doctor of Philosophy in Development Administration (International curriculum), Doctor of Political Science (Strategy and Security), Doctor of Political Science (Political Economy and Governance), Doctor of Philosophy (Management) and

Doctor of Philosophy (Public Administration). Additionally, Prof. Dr. Ahmad Atory Hussain confirmed that the education plan in Malaysia extends over 20 years. In his opinion, the structure of PA study in Malaysia is unlikely to change in the near future. Conversely, in Thailand, PA is a popular curriculum that is now included in most higher education institutions. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, prime minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, expressed his wish in "Vision 2020" to see Malaysia becoming a fully developed country by 2020 (Weerakul 2014), while the statistics from various sources indicate that Malaysia will reach its goal in 2018 (Weerakul 2014a). Meanwhile, Thailand is reforming, with the ASEAN community watching for further developments in post-reform Thailand.

Acknowledgments by Pratumtip Thongcharoen

The success of this thesis could not have been achieved without the support of the following people and organizations. First of all, Dr. Chokchai Suttawet (advisor) and co-advisors Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sirirat Choonhaklai, Asst. Prof. Dr. Gamolporn Sonsri and Asst. Prof. Dr. Jitlada Amornwatana, who gave me a chance to learn and study both theoretically and practically through trial and error. I also wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to six PA experts in each subfield: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Uthai Laohavichien, Assoc. Prof. Nonglak Wattanasingha, Prof. Dr. Boonton Dockthaisong, Prof. Dr. Tin Pratchayaphrut and Assoc. Prof. Somyos Naveekarn, who also gave me invaluable information through interviews. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Supachai Yavaprapas, who was an authoritative specialist of PA throughout my doctoral work.

Notes

1 GNH = Gross National Happiness.

2 Director of DPA (Doctor of Public Administration International Program), Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University, Thailand.

3 Hong Kong Institute of Education and Director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Leadership and Change.

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Influence of Hué temple architecture on the Thai Hóa Palace in the royal citadel

Angunthip Srisuwan and Pham Dang Nhat Thai

Abstract—The historical city of Hué in central Vietnam retains the imprint of the Nguyen Era (1802-1945), when many temples were built and restored. This paper examines the influence of architectural features of the Thai Hóa Palace in the royal citadel on the main shrines of Hué temples. This study is based on field surveys of square-enclosure Khau (口) temples in Hué city, which share similar styles of "double house, one foundation," "one poem, one-drawing," two-layered roof structures, and symbols of decorative motifs at the corner of the roof. The design of the royal palace closely followed the design of the traditional temples in Hué city. The influence of the traditional temples on the royal palace has shaped the cultural heritage of Hué.

Keywords: Hué temple, main shrine, Thai Hóa palace, royal citadel, architectural characteristics

Introduction

In 1558, Lord Nguyen Hoang (1525-1613), from the north of Vietnam, was sent to Hué city (Thuan Hóa) to rule the area. He recruited Buddhist monks from China to set up temples and to enrich the religious tapestry of Vietnam. Since then, Buddhism has been popular throughout the nation (An and Ha, 2006). In 1601, Lord Nguyen Hoang repaired the seven-story Linh Mu pagoda, which was previously associated with the Champa culture of central Vietnam (An, D. V., 1553) and is reported to have hosted a Buddhist conference in 1602. From 1802 to 1945, Hué was the capital of Vietnam under the last Nguyen Dynasty. The former royal capital is the center of Buddhism in Vietnam. During the Nguyen Era, many temples were

constructed and renovated, as evidenced by the numerous temples located in the city itself and in the surrounding areas. The Nguyen Lords, the Nguyen Dynasty and the aristocracy contributed greatly to the construction and restoration of countless temples in Hué, with Buddhism playing a significant role in the culture of the city.

Most of the temples in Hué were restored and reconstructed between 1957 and1962 and it is a testament to the sympathetic restoration works that the religious structures have retained their traditional style. In 1993, Hué was inscribed on the list of World Heritage sites on the basis of Criterion IV of UNESCO's selection norms: "The Complex of Hué Monuments is an outstanding example of an eastern feudal capital."[1] Thus, the temples are considered to be integral elements of the cultural and architectural characteristics of Hué. The temple ground plans can be classified into four main types defined by Vietnamese names and Chinese pictorial ideograms as follows: Nhat (一), Tam (三), Lieu (了) and Khau (口) (Liem, 2000). The temples with square Khau (口) layout have four buildings enclosing a central space. Their layout and decorative motifs share numerous traits with the Thai Hóa palace (Palace of Supreme Harmony), a spacious hall used for the emperor's official receptions and important ceremonies in the Hué royal citadel. The square temples are among the most appreciated due to their completeness in form and arrangement since inception. There appears to be some basic concepts shared between the main shrine of these temples and the Thai Hóa palace in the royal citadel. This articles analyzes the relationship in form, layout, and decoration between the royal citadel and the temples with the Khau square enclosure.

In Hué, temples are places of worship for Buddhist devotees. The main shrine is used for religious ceremonies and offerings. The royal citadel was the working headquarters and symbolic focus of the Nguyen Dynasty. The Thai Hóa palace was central to the planning of the citadel compound. This study examines the features which are shared between the temples and the royal citadel, in particular between the main shrine and the Thai Hóa palace.

As the center of Buddhism in Vietnam, Hué city has more than 100 temples. Those recently constructed or restored share few, if any, features with the traditional temples. A field survey found 21 temples with the Khau square plan. In some the layout was distorted by new constructions and renovations. Three are located in the northwest and

18 in the southwest. In nine temples, one to three buildings had been relocated during renovation, resulting in the closure of the inner courtyard and transforming the square plan structure in the process. Two temples had been reconstructed entirely in another format. Therefore, only ten of the 21 temples have retained their original layout. All of them are located in the southwest of the city. This articles focuses on these ten temples, especially on the main shrine on account of its prominent position at the heart of the compound, akin to the supreme hall in a royal citadel.

The primary data are physical characteristics, collected by means of architectural measurements, photographs, sketch drawings, and so on. Historical data on the structures were collected from interviews, reports, articles, old pictures and photographs.

Literature review

Following the nomination of Hué as a World Heritage Site in 1993, many studies have been conducted on the city's rich history and cultural heritage. An (2000) described the architecture of Hué monuments, including the citadel. He argues that the citadel was constructed in accordance with *feng shui* principles[2] and the Vauban[3] style of fortification from Europe. *Feng shui* originated in China, from where it spread to Vietnam and beyond. For Xiang (2012), the concept is a practical academic skill to explore and explain the relationship between natural phenomena and human living space. *Feng shui* integrates several aspects of Chinese philosophy, such as religion, science, witchcraft rituals, and so on. For Farrington (1999), it is a Chinese philosophical system for harmonizing the environment.

Feng shui is one of the Five Arts of Chinese Metaphysics (mountain, medicine, divination, destiny and physiognomy). *Feng shui* is concerned with an invisible force (cosmic energy) that integrates the universe, Earth and humanity, known as *qi*. *Feng shui* is used for orienting sites and buildings in an auspicious manner (Wikimedia Foundation, 2015). The auspiciousness of a site is affected by natural features such as mountains, bodies of water, stars, and compass oreintation.

Tung et al. (2011) postulates that the Hué citadel is designed on *feng shui* principles, in which the Huong (Perfume) River represents

the Bright Court, the Ngu Binh Mountain serves as a screen, and the Hen and Da Vien sandbanks serve as Left Green Dragon and Right White Tiger respectively. On the basis of these analogies, the citadel illustrates the *feng shui* philosophy.

Liem (2000) has detailed the history of the city's 33 temples. Thong et al. (1993) details the temples restored in 1957-1962 and influenced by the royal architecture and folk architecture of Hué.

This study is the first attempt to examine the influence of the main building of temples on the royal citadel in Hué. The following two sections analyze the royal citadel and the temples respectively.

Royal Citadel

Components

The Hué citadel is located at the center of Hué, along the northern bank of the Perfume (Huong) River. The royal complex is the location of centralized government and the symbol of the Nguyen Dynasty centralized power.

The citadel is symmetrically designed along a longitudinal axis, facing to the southwest. Construction began in 1805 (shortly after the Nguyen Dynasty was installed in Hué) by Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802-1819) and was completed during the reign of Emperor Minh Mang (r. 1820-1840) in 1832 (An, 2011: 16-18).

The location is ideal for a royal site due to the auspiciousness of the river, plains and other physical features that embody fertility and abundance. According to *feng shui* principles, the Huong river, which flows in front of the citadel, represents the Bright Court, and was deemed to bring fortune to the Dynasty, since water means wealth, prosperity and power. Looking out from the citadel towards the Ngu Binh Mountain (Fig. 1), the Hen sandbank is on the left side and the Da Vien sandbank on the right. Ngu Binh Mountain, representing a Peacock, serves as a screen to deflect evil spirits, while the Hen and Da Vien sandbanks, representing the Left Green Dragon and the Right White Tiger respectively, are the citadel's two guardians.

The citadel is encompassed by three walls, known as the Citadel Wall, the Imperial Wall and the Purple Forbidden Wall. Each wall guarantees a high level of security for each of the three internal areas,

namely the capital citadel, the royal citadel and the forbidden citadel (An, 2011: 15-16). The Capital Wall has a circumference of around 10,000m and is solidly built for the protection of all court activities.



Figure 1. Hué citadel with marks of sandbanks (circles) and direction of its orientation. (Tung, Kobayashi, and Kobayashi, 2011: 920).

The Imperial Wall measures around 2,400m in circumference and is pierced on each side by an entrance: Noon Gate (front), Hoa Binh Gate (back), Hien Nhon Gate (left) and Chuong Duc Gate (right). Office buildings located inside this wall were used by the monarchs and high-ranking mandarins for daily work. The enclosure hosts around 100 monuments of various types (Fig. 2). The Purple Forbidden Wall measures around 1,200m in circumference, housing the private quarters of the Nguyen emperors and their families.

For 30 years after the demise of the Nguyen Dynasty in 1945, Vietnam was in political upheaval involving conflict with the French colonial powers and the US. The Citadel area became a place of evacu-

ation and shelter during attacks. A great number of monuments were seriously damaged by conflict and by the passage of time. Following reunification in 1975, Hanoi became the new national capital, while Hué became the capital of Thua Thien province. As a World Heritage site, Hué attracts large numbers of visitors and is one of the most visited cultural attractions in Vietnam.



Figure 2. The map of the Royal citadel and Forbidden citadel. (https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Hoàng_thành_Huế, modified by the authors).
1) Region of the festive occasions: Noon Gate and Thai Hóa palace.
2) Region of worship: temples of Trieu, Thai, The Hung and Phung Tien.
3) Region of queen-mothers: residences of Dien Tho and Truong Sinh.
4) Region of royal factories and treasures.
5) Region of princes' studies and playgrounds.
6) Forbidden Purple: private quarters of the royal family.

Thai Hóa Palace

From 1558 to 1945, a period of almost four centuries, Hué citadel served as the capital of the Vietnamese kingdom, with Thai Hóa Palace located inside the second enclosure. The palace exists to this day, regal in its splendid features and traditional Hué architecture (Figure 3). The palace was initially constructed by Emperor Gia Long in 1805, renovated in 1833 by Emperor Minh Mang, and further refurbished in 1923 during the reign of Khai Dinh (An, 2011: 49-59).

Figure 3. Thai Hóa palace, the throne of the Nguyen Dynasty emperors (1802-1945). (http://www.molon.de/galleries/Vietnam/Central/Hue/Citadel/img.php?pic=16).

The Thai Hóa Palace is one of Vietnam's most splendid architectural creations and part of the country's historical, cultural and artistic identity. It is located on the main axis of the citadel, opposite the Forbidden Citadel and behind the Noon Gate (see Figure 2, area 1). The palace consists of two buildings connected by a common roof and common foundation in the so-called crab-shell layout, or "double house, one foundation." The building is 44.0m long, 30.5m wide and 11.8m high.

The frame is constructed from ironwood and closely connected by means of trusses and beams. The 80 ironwood columns are adorned with dragon and cloud patterns that symbolize the relations between the Emperor and his subjects. The inner space is divided into seven *gian* or bays between the rows of columns, and two *chai* or verandahs (see Figure 4). Its two-layer roof is covered by lapis tiles. Between the two roof layers, there is a vertical panel on all four sides, decorated with drawings and poems of the Emperors on each panel, known as a "one poem, one drawing."[4] The roof ridge is decorated with two dragons

playing with the sun. The eaves and roof corners have ornamented designs with clouds, head-turning dragons and zoomorphic figures including unicorns, tortoises and phoenixes. All the decorations and the moldings along the eaves are inlayed with multicolored ceramics. The decorative patterns inside the palace include dragons and clouds. According to popular belief, the Vietnamese are descended from a dragon and consequently the dragon has become a powerful symbol. The dragon is also believed to embody the strength and majesty of the king and is depicted as one of the Four Sacred Animals together with the unicorn, the tortoise and the phoenix.



Figure 4. The plan of Thai Hóa palace with the style of "double house, one foundation". (Sketched by the Conservation Center of Hué Relics and edited by the authors).

Hué's Khau temples

Configuration

The plan of a Khau temple is understood as a "mouth." The plan

is a combination of four buildings: main shrine (*chinh dien*); house for the monks (*tang xa*); house for guests (*khach duong*); and house of worship (*linh duong*). All the buildings are built with the same plan and architectural structure. These four buildings enclose a square-shaped inner courtyard. The layout is based on *feng shui* principles displaying symmetry, a strong axis, and balance between the left, right, front, and back (Figure 5).



Figure 5. The overall plan of a Khau temple in Hué. (Thai and Srisuwan, 2015: 89).

The temple's main entrance, the Tam Quan Gate, has triple gates. The main gate leads to the main shrine across a courtyard with a symmetrical arrangement of pine trees, cypress trees, numerous types of bonsai trees and potted plants. An auxiliary gate leads directly to the monks' quarters, guests' quarters and kitchen. Facing the house of worship is the reception hall, often called the main shrine. It consists of two buildings on one foundation, with a shrine for Buddhist worship located in-between. To left and right are rooms for the abbot and the monks respectively. Behind the main shrine is an inner court-

yard, adorned with plants, flowers, potted plants and bonsai trees, and surrounded by the monks' quarters and guest quarters. At the end of this courtyard is house of worship. Beyond is a courtyard with a dining hall and quarters for the novices. At the rear of the temple is an area planted with fruit trees, and the tombs of former monks.

In the ten Khau temples in Hué city which have retained their original layout, the main shrine, house of worship, and quarters for monks and guests are grouped around an inner courtyard. The enclosures are rectangular rather than square. The main shrine is the most important building and hence is the focus for the analysis of architectural characteristics.

All the ten Khau temples were built between 1674 and 1924, as listed in Table 1. They are found in four wards: Phuong Duc (1 temple), Truong An (2 temples), Thuy Xuan (4 temples) and An Tay (3 temples).

Table 1. List of traditional-style Khau temples

Temples	Name	Year of Construction	Location (ward)
T-01	Bao Quoc	1674	Phuong Duc
T-02	Quoc An	1683	Truong An
T-03	Kim Tien	> 1697	Truong An
T-04	Vien Thong	1697	An Tay
T-05	Tu Lam	> 1699	Thuy Xuan
T-06	Thuyen Ton	1708	An Tay
T-07	Dong Thuyen	1739	Thuy Xuan
T-08	Tu Hieu	1843	Thuy Xuan
T-09	Truc Lam	1903	Thuy Xuan
T-10	Dieu Vien	1924	An Tay

Thai and Srisuwan, 2015: 81-98.

Location of surveyed temples

The ten temples are set in relatively flat, semi-mountainous terrain among the thick forests of the Ham Long, Duong Xuan, Binh An hills, and Thien Thai and Ngu Binh mountains (Figure 6). The loca-

tion on a hilly site follows *feng shui* concepts. The Ngu Binh mountain serves as a protective screen.



Figure 6. Map of ten temples of Khau structure in the southwest of Hué city. (Thai and Srisuwan, 2015: 85).

Plan of the main shrine in square-shaped Khau temples

The main shrine is located to the south and consists of connected buildings with three or five bays between rows of pillars and two verandahs. The bays, which are smaller than in the palace, house Buddha statues. The monks' quarters are on the left, and the abbot's on the

right. A longitudinal axis also runs through from the main entrance through the main shrine, inner courtyard and house of worship, as illustrated in Fig. 7.



Figure 7. The plan of the main shrine (Thai and Srisuwan, 2015: 91).

Architectural characteristics of the main shrine

The architectural characters of the main shrine in the ten temples are shown in Table 2.

Eight of the ten are in the form of "double house, one foundation," meaning the reception hall at the front and Buddhist shrine at the back are built on the same foundation (Figure 8).

In nine of the ten temples, the main shrine has a two-layer roof which allows light into the interior.

In these nine temples, the panels between the two layers of the roof are in the style of "one poem, one drawing," meaning each panel is decorated with poems and drawings inspired by Buddhism.

In all ten temples, the middle of the roof ridge is decorated with dragon and swastika motifs.

Eight of the ten main shrines have animal decorations at the roof corners, while the other two have only dragon and clouds.

Table 2. Characteristics of the main shrine in Khau plan temples in Hué

	On the Main Shrine				
Elements	1	2	3	4	5
Temples	Do	Cu	En	To	Sy
T-01	●	●	●	●	●
T-02	●	●	●	●	●
T-03	●	●	●	●	●
T-04		●	●	●	●
T-05	●	●	●	●	
T-06	●	●	●	●	●
T-07				●	
T-08	●	●	●	●	●
T-09	●	●	●	●	●
T-10	●	●	●	●	●
Total	8	9	9	10	8
Percentage	80%	90%	90%	100%	80%

Source: compiled by the authors.
Do = Double house, one foundation;
Cu = Double-layered roof;
En = Drawings and poems on Buddhism;
To = Symbol of the dragon and swastika in the middle top of the roof;
Sy = Symbols of dragon, unicorn, tortoise, phoenix and cloud at the corners of the roof.

The temples have been constructed with natural materials sourced locally, such as jackfruit wood, ironwood, brick, glazed bricks, cement, sand, stone and ceramics. The main colors are gray and pale yellow. Strong and contrasting colors have been used in the motifs on the panels between the two roof layers on the main shrine.

Discussion

There are several similarities between the Thai Hóa Palace in the royal citadel and the main shrine of Khau plan temple. Both are situated at the centre of the site and both are in the "double house, one foundation" style. Both are laid out with a central axes and symmetry that reflect the concern for balance in *feng shui* philosophy. The Thai Hóa Palace, however, is much larger than the temple's main shrines (seven compartments at Thai Hóa Palace against three-five compartments at the temple shrines), probably because of its practical and symbolic roles as the center of royal power.

Figure 8. Main shrine of Quoc An temple (T-02 in Table 2). (http://www.bookin.vn/chua-quoc-an).

The Thai Hóa Palace and the main shrines share the "one poem, one drawing" style, namely a double-layered roof and panels between the roof layers bearing poems and drawings. However, the text and figures on the panels are different. The panels of the Thai Hoa palace have poems and drawings about emperors while those on the temple shrines are on Buddhist themes.

The middle of the roof ridge on the Thai Hóa Palace has two dragons playing with the sun, which symbolize the power of the emperors. At the same position on the temples' main shrines

there are a dragon's face and swastika, which can be read as the dragon and wheel of *samsara*, symbols of the cycle of birth, death and rebirth in Buddhist philosophy. In addition, the roof corners both at the Thai Hóa Palace and the main shrines are decorated with dragon motifs, unicorn, tortoise, phoenix and clouds. These mythical animals were important to both royal architecture and religious architecture, especially dragon sculptures that are present in all temples and at the royal citadel.

Conclusions

Comparison or royal and temple architecture is a new field in Vietnam. This study has revealed the following similarities between the Thai Hóa Palace in the royal citadel and ten temples with a traditional Khau (口) plan in the southwest of Hué city.

In both cases, the principal building is situated at the heart of the site, signifying its importance. They are both used by the public. Both have bays and verandahs which can accommodate a large number of visitors. Both share the style of "double house, one foundation," with two buildings on the same foundation. Both have two-layer roofs with panels in the "one poem, one drawing" style. Both have dragon motifs and other animals as decoration of roof ridge and roof corners.

These buildings have both practical and symbolic functions. The royal building is a symbol of the monarch's power and his wealth. The temple exudes calmness, in keeping with Buddhist tradition.

The Hué citadel is believed to have been constructed in conformity with *feng shui* philosophy (An, 2000) but there is no supporting documentation. Temples in Vietnam are frequently influenced by *feng shui* philosophy, though again there is no documentary evidence. This study found that *feng shui* philosophy acts as a mainstream of concept to royal architecture and religious architecture in Hué. According to Farrington (1999) and Xiang (2012), *feng shui* has been employed to ensure the auspiciousness of both the palace and the Khau temples. This is evident from the use of axes, symmetry, and balance in the architectural design. *Feng shui* is influential in the planning of the overall layout, but the construction is limited by architectural constraints.

The Thai Hóa Palace and the main shrines of Hué's traditional Khau temples seem to share the same architectural tradition.

Notes

1 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/678.

2 *Feng shui* guided the location for the royal architecture in the citadel, for its auspicious geographical features such as rivers, mountains, plains and other morphological characteristics representing fertile, verdant and luxuriant attributes.

3 Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707) was a French engineer, expert in military architecture, Marshal of France and honorary member of the French Academy of Sciences. Under Emperor Louis XIV, Vauban was responsible for upgrading the fortifications of around 300 cities. He is credited with inventing the military construction known as the "fortified city" or "inalienable city", a type of fortification consisting of a "complex of architectural structures which are closely related [to] each other and bear characteristics of highly solid defense" (*Hue Citadel – An Outstanding Example of Military Structure in Asia*, by Nguyen Van Phuc, 2014, Hue Monuments Conservation Center, accessed on 30 June 2016 from http://www.fortress-namhansanseong.or.kr/upload/bbs/20141714204440.pdf).

4 "One poem, one drawing" (*nhat thi-nhat hoa*) is a style of royal architecture, with poems inscribed and drawings painted on panels.

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Achieving access to health for mobile populations through community health systems on the Thai-Myanmar border*

Cynthia Maung and Tara Russell

Abstract—Over the past two decades, communities in the border areas of Tak Province, Thailand, and in neighboring districts of Myanmar, have established a primary healthcare system. Conflict, displacement and institutional neglect have left this region of Eastern Myanmar without functioning public health services. Forced displacement and statelessness excluded these same communities from health services in Thailand. This paper presents two short case studies that describe how the network prioritizes access to basic care at the village level, with ethnic and community organizations training village health workers to provide health education and to manage common diseases. More serious cases are referred to a network of field and community clinics, and to hospitals on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border. This latter engagement with government hospitals in Thailand demonstrates an enabling policy environment that develops the adaptive capacity of migrants, rather than regulation that focuses on threat and victimhood. This paper concludes that this kind of approach can provide a future blueprint to guide early engagement between the community health system and national health system reform in Myanmar.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, communities in the border areas of Tak Province, Thailand, and in neighboring districts of Myanmar, have established a primary healthcare system. Conflict, displacement and institutional neglect have left this region of Eastern Myanmar

* An early version of this paper was presented at the *Conference on Migration, Security and Development,* 18 December 2014, entitled "Community health systems for access to healthcare across borders.

Asian Review 28(2), 2015, pp. 39–56.

without functioning public health services. Forced displacement and statelessness excluded these same communities from health services in Thailand. Prioritizing access to basic care at the village level, ethnic and community organizations have trained village health workers to provide health education and to manage common diseases. More serious cases are referred to a network of field and community clinics, and to hospitals on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border.

Cross-border communities have often been portrayed as a human security threat—as trafficked or trafficking, as smugglers, as refugees, as insurgents. In spite of this, and with limited access to social services in Tak Province, and in the absence of national social service infrastructure reaching Eastern Myanmar, they depend on their own social service network. In this way, they develop their communities' health and social security. This network presents a way of understanding migrant and refugee's adaption to be included in their new context, in spite of irregular status and exclusion. Understanding this "adaptive" mechanism provides opportunities for design of policy and programs that develop the community's strength and resilience, rather than creating substitutes or parallel programs.

This is a descriptive paper, which outlines this community's health system as well as some of its successes in addressing both systemic issues and immediate health needs. Two short case studies are presented, the first describing community efforts to address skill shortages, the second focusing on maternal healthcare services. Finally, this paper discusses the growing links between the cross-border community health system and the Thai public health system, and efforts to engage with the Myanmar national health system. These approaches bridge gaps in access to health services experienced by mobile communities and irregular migrants. They allow a continuum of care between patients from village services in remote and conflict-affected areas to hospital-level care in Thailand. And they provide a community-level platform for the implementation of regional disease control initiatives. Furthermore, the recognition of this health system challenges the perception that cross-border communities are either a threat to human security, or merely victims of specific threats such as HIV/AIDs, drugs, or human trafficking. Instead, they are local stakeholders who are constructing community protection mechanisms against these threats.

Data and methods

This paper uses case studies to describe the community health system on the Thai-Myanmar border that serves displaced, migrant, mobile and refugee populations. It is based on information from a desk review of organization policy documents and annual reports. Some aggregate facility level data are used for illustrative purposes. These data were obtained from the Mae Tao Clinic's Health Management Information System, as well as from a patient-satisfaction survey conducted in September 2013. Permission for access to these data was obtained from the Health Information Systems Working Group (HISWG). No formal approval study was obtained as it did not entail new data collection.

Frameworks of migration, protection and security

Migration occurs in three phases: departure, journey and destination (Zimmerman, Kiss and Hossain, 2011). The process can be repeated, or can stall at each phase. Specific health threats occur, and interventions are possible, in each phase. The Thai-Myanmar border is both a political border and a natural geographic border, with a river, mountain range, and dense jungle. In spite of this, there has been significant migration of communities crossing and re-crossing this border throughout the past sixty or so years of conflict in Myanmar, and prior to this period. Irregular migration occurs when the conditions for departure ("push factors") and demands of the destination (employment and other "pull factors") do not fit the regulatory and political contexts (Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010). At the present time, push factors include the ongoing conflicts, militarization, environmental disasters and human rights violations, creating mobile populations that include forced migrants and refugees. There are also "pull" factors across the border in Thailand, such as access to employment, health and social services (Rukumnuaykit, 2009). The population continues to be mobile, crossing back across the border after finishing work or for family reasons, bringing the "three phases" of migration—departing, journey and destination—into a permanent state/status, with consequences for healthcare access and health outcomes.

The scale of this issue for Thailand, and for universal health access

in Thailand, is massive. Thailand has an estimated 2.8 million irregular migrants (Pholphirul and Rukumnuaykit, 2010), of which 400,000 live in Tak Province (Tak Provincial Health Office, 2015), the area under consideration in this paper. Outside of the reach of government regulations, individuals and communities rely on other mechanisms for their protection, survival and health. As elsewhere, there are degrees of inclusion in the wider community and access to services, and governments are not the only regulators of this inclusion. Understanding these mechanisms of inclusion, Black et al. (2011) suggests that irregular migrants can be understood as threats, victims or adaptive. Historically, on the Thai-Myanmar border, far from central administration, communities have negotiated for protection in a patron-client relationship—providing agricultural commodities (or opium) in exchange for protection from local warlords and provincial commanders controlling territory (Sturgeon, 2004).

The historical patron-client relationship leaves migrants as victims, with protection only from certain kinds of violence and exploitation, and without access to services. In the current political context of Thailand, migrants and asylum seekers have been presented as a threat to peace, harmony and economic progress (RSIS Centre for NTS Studies, 2013). However, migrants fill labor shortages in Thailand, and consume goods and services. They send these goods and money back, contributing to development in their home villages (Benach et al., 2011). Within an adaptive framework, a broader understanding of protection can be seen, provided by social networks, employers and by operational limits of states or law enforcement and bureaucracy (Cvajner and Sciortino, 2010). This contributes to household and community resilience to various vulnerabilities and threats. Some policies and local responses recognize and build on the existing adaptive mechanisms that build household and community resilience (Black et al., 2011). The cooperation between the community health system and Thai provincial health programming is an example of this.

Community health system

As Myanmar goes through political and economic reforms, there remain obstacles to cross-border communities accessing healthcare services. Public health services are still in crisis, with insufficient and

underpaid health workers, run-down facilities and medicine shortages. Informal payments are high, with 82 to 85 percent of healthcare expenditure still being out-of-pocket, compared to 14 percent in Thailand (MoH, 2013). The government increased spending on health from 100,825 million kyat ($83.2 million)** in 2011-2012 (MoH, 2013) to 625,745 million kyat ($516.3 million) in 2014-2015 (MoH, 2014), but health still accounts for less than 3.9 percent of the national budget (MoH, 2014). Overseas aid increased from $9.70 per capita in 2012 (considerably below the $49 average for other least developed countries, according to Scott, 2014), to $143.70 in 2013 (Development Assistance Committee, 2015). However, international humanitarian access to border areas is still limited, and is generally confined to vertical programs and to specific areas, with international aid agencies still unable to reach all of the approximately 500,000 displaced persons in the east of Myanmar. The costs of accessing care, as well as the poor quality and limited availability of care, drives many people—not just mobile populations—to seek healthcare outside the country. In 2013, 57 percent of persons at the Tak community clinic were living in Thailand, and 43 percent had travelled from Myanmar for healthcare (MTC, 2015). Ceasefire negotiations have not led to a political resolution, sporadic fighting and militarization continues in some areas, and international investments in mega dams is fueling insecurity (TBC, 2014). In mixed administration areas, and in areas where community members travel between administrative areas for healthcare, dealing with multiple authorities and administrative systems continues to add to the day-to-day difficulties of villagers.

The community health system is a network made up of community- and ethnic-health providers. At the village level, health education, screening and prevention activities, as well as basic case management of the most common diseases, is provided by village health workers and trained birth attendants. These workers refer complex cases to community clinics, where skilled health workers are trained and supplied to manage endemic disease, maternal and child health programs, and carry out community health campaigns. In Eastern Myanmar, there are now over 200 primary healthcare clinics and mobile outreach teams, a handful of secondary healthcare facilities, around a thousand trained primary care workers, and several thou-

** Converted at a rate of 1,212 Myanmar kyat (MMK) to 1 US dollar.

sand village-based auxiliary healthcare workers. There have been some improvements in core health indicators in these areas. Communities now practice healthy behavior such as exclusive breastfeeding, can access antenatal services and safe delivery, and the average age of first delivery is post-adolescence (HISWG, 2015). However, there are also increasing disparities in some areas, as economic development reaches central Myanmar (Table 1 refers).

Table 1: Key health indicators and comparators for Eastern Myanmar displaced population

	Eastern Myanmar 2004[1]	Eastern Myanmar 2013[2]	Myanmar (National)[3]	Thailand[4]
Infant Mortality rate (IMR) per 1,000 live births	91	94.2	40	11
Under 5 Mortality rate (U5MR) per 1,000 live births	221	141.9	51	13
Maternal Mortality (MMR) per 100,000 live births	1,000-1,200	721 (2008)[5]	200	48
Child malnutrition (%)	15.7	16.8	7.9	
Maternal malnutrition (%)	16.7 (2008)[5]	11.3		

[1] Backpack Health Worker Team. 2004. Chronic Emergency Backpack Health Worker Team. 2004. Chronic Emergency. [2] HISWG, 2015. [3] World Bank, 2015. [4] MoH, 2013. [5] Figure for 2013 not available. Parmar et al., 2014.

Referral networks are improving, but the journey for those who are referred for healthcare services remains dangerous and expensive. Infant mortality and child malnutrition rates have both worsened, and although maternal malnutrition has improved, it remains a concern.

Malaria, acute respiratory infections and diarrhea remain the leading causes of death. The evidence of improved protective behavior noted above, without parallel improvements in child mortality and with worsening malnutrition rates, suggests that the social determinants of health in children have worsened in the period under analysis.

In Tak Province, community health service provision is centered around the Mae Tao Clinic (MTC). This is a 200-bed, community-managed primary health care facility, based in the border town of Mae Sot. It was established in 1989 to provide urgent care to people fleeing persecution and conflict at that time. It has developed into a comprehensive facility offering a wide variety of services and outreach with interventions in the languages spoken by communities in the border areas and that are culturally accessible. It serves as a training center, training its own health workers, as well as providing a clinically supervised experience for members of the community health network in Eastern Myanmar. Community outreach is also provided to the local migrant worker community. For individuals from Myanmar, access to government services in Thailand is not as simple as crossing the border. Individuals lack documents, resources and information to access their entitlements. Thai institutions face policy, logistical and political challenges to provide services to the large undocumented and mobile populations. The mobility of the population means that these categorizations are not always meaningful, and is a further challenge for accessing services. Many people who would describe themselves as living in Myanmar also travel into Thailand regularly to access medical care and other services. Many are still without documents. In 2012, out of 3,314 babies born at the Mae Tao Clinic, only 9 percent had a mother or father with legal documents (MTC, 2012). In 2014, as a result of migrant registration, around 33 percent had a mother or father with legal documents. This is a rapid improvement, but two thirds of the children born in the clinic still had parents with no legal documents, meaning they were without official access to Thai health or social services (MTC, 2012).

Successive Thai administrations have recognized the right of migrant workers to access healthcare under national universal coverage schemes. Yet barriers to access remain (Chamchan and Apipornchaisakul, 2012). Changes to the work permit system and improvements in access to health insurance for migrant workers have been welcome,

expanding access to care by particularly vulnerable groups such as people living with HIV and pregnant women. In spite of this, only 14.5 percent of migrant workers in Tak Province had purchased health insurance by the end of 2014 (Tak Provincial Health Office, 2015). In a survey (MTC, 2013) of patients accessing the community clinic in 2013, 67.5 percent of patients living in Thailand said that they were unaware of health insurance or social security schemes. Of these, 2.1 percent also stated that they did not think they needed health insurance or social security. There is a need for increased communication and information targeting the migrant community in Thailand, and including information about healthcare entitlements and Thailand's health insurance and social security schemes. Improving access to subsidized care would represent a major impact. Over 60 percent of patients in the 2013 survey also said that they came to the community clinic because they could not afford care in the official Thai or Myanmar health systems (MTC, 2013).

Case Study 1: mobile communities as the health workforce

Myanmar suffers from an acute shortage of health workers. Nationally, there are 0.68 doctors, nurses, and midwives (combined) per 1,000 people (Sein et al., 2014), which is below the World Health Organization (WHO) critical shortage threshold of 2.3 health workers per 1,000 people (WHO, 2006). In Eastern Myanmar, there are specific factors of geographical remoteness, poverty and conflict, which make it difficult to recruit and retain health workers. In areas of Thailand bordering Myanmar, there are also shortages relating to quantity and quality issues. Provincial health services face challenges recruiting and retaining workers, with many leaving for urban, private, or overseas employment (Pagaiya et al., 2011). While Thai health workers are trained to rigorous standards, further training is needed to address specific communication barriers and understanding of migrant health issues and rights.

The community health workforce also faces displacement, resettlement and limited access to education. To address this, the community and ethnic health network have adopted the following strategies to promote the retention of the health workforce.

Table 2: WHO guidance and corresponding community strategies for retaining the ethnic health workforce (HSSWG, 2014)

	WHO (2010) GUIDANCE	JOINT STRATEGY
TRAINING	Targeting admissions to increase the likelihood of graduates choosing to practice in isolated areas	Community nomination of trusted persons for training as village and community health workers
		Deployment of health workers to match their home community
	Locating schools and residency programs outside of cities	Transitioning training from cross-border training centers to field clinics
	Revising curricula to include topics relevant to context	Refresher/upgrade trainings on drug-resistant malaria
		New curricula for field monitoring and management
	Design of relevant professional development accessible from where they live and work	Transition of CHW training to district sites
		Provision of monitoring workshops at field sites
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT	Sustainable financial incentives to outweigh opportunity costs	Review and standardising stipends
		Non-monetary support—rations, housing support
	Provide a safe working environment	Taking advantage of improved security situation in transport arrangements
		Mental health training for self-care and peer support
		Standardising health worker to population ratios
	Provide career development opportunities in isolated areas	Decentralising decision-making, where appropriate, to district and clinic levels
	Adopt public recognition measures	Health workers recognised at cultural events
	Adopt public recognition measures	Development of village health committees

POLICY	Introduce and regulate enhanced scopes of practice	Standardizing key competencies across partners
	Compulsory service requirements are accompanied by support and incentives	Linking training opportunities to compulsory service requirements for both field and administrative staff
		Providing opportunities for advancement for all capable staff
	Providing education subsidies to increase recruitment	Advocating to donors for provision of scholarships to suitably motivated ethnic health workers
	Introduce different types of health workers with appropriate training and regulation	Adopting task-shifting approach

This final strategy is recommended by the WHO as a means to address skill shortages in low resource settings (WHO, 2008). Specific tasks that are usually administered by doctors and nurses are allocated to lower-rank health worker cadres. In Eastern Myanmar, community-based medics, maternal health workers and community health workers are recruited from the community, trained and tasked with providing primary healthcare (Table 2). A study documenting the application of the task-shifting approach in the community health system in Karen State, Eastern Myanmar, was published in the *Global Health Action Journal* (Low et al., 2014). The authors conducted a rapid mapping exercise with clinic-in-charges in 110 clinics in 14 Karen townships. A one-page questionnaire recorded numbers and types of health workers, training received by these health workers, and services provided. This was supplemented with a desk review of organizational policies and training documents.

In the community health system in the area surveyed, the study encountered a regional average of 2.8 (combined) per 1000 people, well above the critical threshold. It showed evidence of a systematic approach to task-shifting, including 6-24 months theoretical and clinical training, as well as ongoing supervision, monitoring and support for health workers. The health workers were providing a standard primary health care (PHC) package, following clinical protocols that

have been recognized as effective in similar settings worldwide. It also found that the health workforce is recognized, accepted and trusted by local community members. The report concluded that task shifting can ensure equitable PHC access. Large numbers of people are receiving vital health services where otherwise there would be none. There is also indirect evidence of the positive impacts of primary healthcare coverage through task shifting, e.g.:

- increase from 20 percent (2008) to 58.2 percent (2013) in the proportion of children receiving vitamin A tablets;
- prevalence of malaria reduced from 6.9 percent (2008) to 2.2 percent (2013);
- 84 percent of people in community service area access trained in birth attendance.

Case study 2: Migrants providing for safe motherhoods

In 2013, Myanmar had an estimated maternal mortality ratio (MMR) of 200 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (World Bank, 2015), Table 1 above refers. Even though the official figures represent a 4.5 percent annual reduction since 1990, the MMR still remains 20 percent above the Asia and Pacific regional average of 160 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. Myanmar ranked second worst for the region, after Indonesia, in terms of maternal mortality ratios. MMRs in Myanmar's eastern border areas were also found to be as high as 721 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in a 2008 survey, or 3.5 times the national average (Stover et al., 2007). Adding to the complex situation, decades of civil conflict have resulted in thousands of children born without citizenship in either Myanmar or Thailand, and therefore without the protection that citizenship entails. Moreover, community health workers operating in the border areas continue to provide vital services despite lack of recognition and accreditation. Performing the role of healthcare professionals without documents means that they operate outside the law, and can be arrested. In the past, health workers and healthcare infrastructure were targeted by the military.

To provide maternal and child healthcare in these hard-to-reach areas, the network employs three levels of community health workers

comprising of specialized midwives, maternal child-health workers and trained traditional-birth attendants. This program provides specialized training in management and delivery of basic emergency obstetric care, focused antenatal care, family planning and essential neonatal care for remote and conflict-affected communities.

The community clinic in Tak serves as a referral point for the ethnic community network, as well as providing comprehensive reproductive health services for the migrant and wider community. With time, the growth of the network in Eastern Myanmar and Thailand has meant that it has gained recognition from Thai health services. The result has been improvements in safe delivery, access in obstetric emergencies and access to birth registration, family planning, post-abortion care and referral pathways to safe abortion. In 2015, community and ethnic providers in Myawaddy and Tak provided assistance to thousands of women (Table 3).

Table 3. Assistance provided in 2015 by community and ethnic providers in Myawaddy and Tak provinces

Number of live births by selected service provider, 2014	
Tak public hospitals [1]	2,603
Myawaddy public hospital [2]	1,500
Community clinic, Tak [3]	3,028
Ethnic/community network, Myawaddy [4]	1,400
Refugee camp, Tak [5]	1,393

[1] Tak Provincial Health Office. Tak Population. Presentation for MoPH Minister visit on 14 January 2015.

[2] Estimate provided to Mae Tao clinic by Myawaddy Hospital.

[3] Mae Tao Clinic. 2012. Monthly Birth Registration Record.

[4] HISWG. 2015. Birth Records. Unpublished database.

[5] The Border Consortium. 2015. Camp deliveries. Unpublished database.

Discussion: vulnerable communities engaging with Thai and Myanmar health authorities

Under security frameworks, migration is addressed as a "threat", with migrants monitored and screened, posed as a vector of disease (Zimmerman, Kiss and Hossain, 2011). Policies or programs that label migrants and refugees as victims, "vulnerable" to specific threats, employment hazards, exclusion and discrimination, needing support to access services, is also limiting when one considers the range and complexity of the community health system that has developed on the Thai-Myanmar border. This border is a place of transit as well as a destination, and an intersection of services. Within the migrant and refugee community, there are overlapping sub-groups with different risk profiles: "healthy workers" with non-communicable diseases; those who specifically travel for health care; individuals that have been detained, are traumatized and self-medicate; and many more.

The current changing political and humanitarian context provides an opportunity to form policy and program responses that strengthen rather than replace the community health system. Overcoming the issue of cost only addresses one of the multiple barriers that continue to prevent cross-border communities from accessing healthcare. Individuals with documents tend to be healthier, have higher skills and incomes, and better access to health services (Zimmerman, Kiss and Hossain, 2011). Multi-staged and circular migration means both an accumulation of health threats and multiple opportunities for intervention (Zimmerman, Kiss and Hossain, 2011).

There have been a number of notable efforts in promoting collaboration between the community health system and Thai health authorities. The current framework guiding this collaboration process is the "Border health master plan and health strategies on migrant health in Thailand 2012-2016". This plan aims to expand access to health services for migrants in Thailand, and specifically serves to advance public health along the border. The plan has three goals. The section below outlines activities of the community health system contributing to the achievement of these goals.

a. Develop a quality health service system. The community health system contributes to this goal through service provision at the Mae Tao Clinic (Thailand) and field clinics (Myanmar); surveillance of

endemic and reportable disease; development of a monitoring system for standard setting and quality improvement; safe disposal of medical waste; and a training hub for the community health network. Mae Tao Clinic manages a training center for the community health network. Lower cadres of health workers are increasingly trained at field sites in Eastern Myanmar, with the community clinic providing a venue for supervised clinical internships. Midwifery programs now cooperate with both Thai and Myanmar health authorities.

b. Promote access to primary health services. Through task-shifting to village-based health workers for common endemic diseases; health promotion in villages and schools; rehabilitation services (including counselling, prosthetic rehabilitation for landmine survivors, physiotherapy for early recovery and home-based care for HIV/AIDS); and strengthening referral networks between the community and government service. In 2014, from Mae Tao Clinic to Thai government services, there were 406 OPD (out-patient) cases referred, 444 in-patient cases and 5,753 dentistry cases. Specialist referral is provided for cases of sexual- and gender-based violence, and other protection issues, as well as cross-border for HIV/AIDS, PMPCT and ARV.

c. Strengthen collaboration and participation from all stakeholders and sectors. Is the goal area which shows the areas of most recent innovation:

Certification of health workers: Community health workers, some of whom are trained in advanced healthcare, do not have recognized qualifications in Thailand or Myanmar. Through collaboration with Thai and American Universities, health workers are receiving official certification, following curricula also used in Myanmar. These programs are working towards having these qualifications recognized in Myanmar.

Malaria Elimination taskforce began as a collaboration in 2013 and targets 800 villages in areas of identified drug resistance. The taskforce includes village health workers, community leaders, program managers, geographers, epidemiologists, biostatisticians, anthropologists and logisticians.

Expanded program of immunization is a collaboration between the Tak Public Health Office and the community networks. Field clinics in Eastern Myanmar are "twinned" with a neighboring health center on the Thai side of the border. Clinic workers are trained and supplied

by Thai health authorities in the transport and administration of an expanded program of childhood immunization in Eastern Myanmar.

d. Community health system collaboration efforts with the Myanmar government. Since 2012, civil society groups have made efforts to collaborate and meet with national and provincial health authorities in Myanmar. As a result of these meetings, there has been increased standardization between the parallel health systems in some areas—for example, malaria protocols for control of drug resistance. To date, there has not been tangible progress on key issues such as the recognition of health workforce and of the community health-care system. The national regulations on international organizations also restricts access to these areas. The types of programs approved to date are vertical, and risk fragmenting the holistic, community-based approach, rather than strengthening the existing ethnic and community system (Jolliffe, 2014).

Conclusion

Myanmar still has a long and difficult road ahead to peace and stability. If political reforms in 2015 are to include the expansion of public health services to previously politically and geographically isolated areas of Myanmar, they will require:

- Continuing cooperation between Thailand and community health system in border areas for comprehensive primary healthcare;
- Investment in, and empowerment of, the existing community infrastructure and human resources within Eastern Myanmar and migrant and refugee communities in Thailand;
- Building on the success of the task-shifting approach by addressing barriers to secondary healthcare;
- Further development of cross-border coordination between the community health system and the official Thai and Myanmar health services.

The true measure of change in Myanmar will be the cessation of armed conflict and human rights abuses, when people provide a vote of confidence in the country's changes by returning home in safety

and dignity. They will no longer have to travel great distances, across borders, to access basic education and healthcare services. This is a community empowered to manage its health, with internal regulation and coordination for standardization. However, coordination with government and other non-government providers remains difficult with centralized decision-making, inadequate communications infrastructure and a need to overcome years of mistrust. The community-level healthcare system, structure and workforce are also still not officially recognized. These coordination issues are not just a problem in relation to government providers. Some international organizations who have not had access to these areas assume communities are passive victims of the insurgency needing their care, and not local actors who have mobilized to manage their community's health.

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MoH	Ministry of Health, Myanmar
MTC	Mae Tao Clinic
TBC	The Border Consortium
WHO	World Health Organization

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Thailand's national security policies: Knowledge of the Deep South unrest

Punpipit Pipitpun

Abstract

This is a study of Thailand's security policies towards unrest in the three Deep South border provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat. This article will analyze and describe the causes of the conflict between the Thai government and separatist movement. It also explores concepts, strategies and approaches employed by the Thai government in policy implementation and their impact on the situation. The article will illustrate my interpretation for origin, ideology and strategy of the separatist movements in the history of conflict. The last part of this article will explain how the insurgent movement in the Deep South has affected, and continues to affect, life in these southern Thai provinces.

Keywords: Security policies, Deep South of Thailand, Islamic unrest

Introduction

Since January 2004, violence has plagued the three Muslim-dominated southern border provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat in Thailand. The first string of violent acts was a well-coordinated operation in early January 2004, conducted by Muslim militants in Narathiwat province, who assaulted an army camp, killing four soldiers and seizing a large cache of weapons. The militants also set up numerous booby traps and blocked access to a key road, preventing pursuit by the Thai authorities. At around the same time, 18 schools were set alight

and two unoccupied military facilities were also damaged that night. No organizations or groups claimed responsibility for these actions but there was considerable fear that a new phase of Islamic unrest was beginning to rage in the south.

These fears were supported by two further significant acts of violence in 2004. In late April 2004, a group of militants attempted an assault on security forces outposts, which led to Thai soldiers storming a mosque believed to be holding key militants. As a result, 32 militants were killed by the troops whilst other militants took refuge in the historic Krue-Se mosque. By the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in October, hundreds of protestors were arrested while holding a demonstration in front of the Tak Bai Police Station. Seventy-eight of the protestors died, while being transported to a Thai military camp. The majority died from suffocation after spending more than five hours being smothered by the bodies of other detainees (Jitpiromsri and McCargo, 2008). These fatalities furthered antagonized the Muslim resistance movement, strengthening their resolve to fight the Thai state in the Deep South.

Although there have not been any incidents on the same scale as the Krue-Se and Tak Bai events (McCargo, 2009b), the Islamic insurgency in the southern border provinces of Thailand has escalated significantly, both in numbers and intensity. Consequently, the violent situation in the south has become a significant problem that affects both the lives of local people and the government attempting to develop policies in these provinces.

There are a number of militant groups involved in violent acts throughout southern Thailand but none has claimed responsibility. Security officials in Thailand are strongly suspicious that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional–Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi), or BRN-C for short, through their armed forces the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), is responsible for most of these violent incidents. This group is believed to be involved in a number of brutal operations, including bombings and assassinations (McCargo, 2009a).

From 2004 to 2011, Thailand has had five prime ministers, all of whom devised a set of policy measures and implementation strategies to solve the problem. However, this paper will focus on three prime ministers, namely Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-2006), General (ret.) Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008) and Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011)

since the remaining two, namely the late Samak Sundaravej (January-September 2008) and Somchai Wongsawat (September-December 2008), were in power for a short period and did not develop any significant policy measures toward solving the unrest in the southern border provinces of Thailand. In general, although the three prime ministers' policy measures, as well as implementation strategies, were different, their measures share two features: firstly, the allocation of resources to develop industrial projects in the region and, secondly, uncompromising adherence to the principle of the unitary state. Unfortunately, the measures of these different governments have not resulted in concrete steps to solve the problem.

Causes of conflict

The causes of the Deep South conflict can be divided in to three main factors. The first factor is ideology. The insurgent ideology in the latest phase of the separatist movement is a complex mix of three elements: 1. the historical legacy of the kingdom of Patani, which provides legitimacy for resisting the Thai government; 2. affinities between the Malay-Muslim community in Southern Thailand and the Malays of the Peninsula Malaysia, which generated a sense of "otherness" between local Thai Buddhist and Thai-Malay Muslims; 3. Islam and the principle of *jihad*, which authorizes violence against government officers and the locals who support the Thai state (Phiphitthaphan, 2005a; Christie, 1996). In conjunction these three elements, motivate young insurgents to oppose the Thai government. This first element originated from the work of Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen, the leader of the Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR; League of Malays of Great Patani) and is also associated with other aristocratic Malays keen to re-establish the kingdom of Patani and their authority over this region. The Malay identity and Islam have been employed to win cooperation and support from the local community of Malay Muslims.

The separatist ideology not only contains a sense of belonging to the past prosperous Patani kingdom, but also includes a refusal to recognize the mainstream version of Thai history (Fathy al-Fatani, 1994). There is an emphasis on the repeated division and disintegration of the territory, due to misinformation and constant reminding

by separatist leaders who have particular political interests. The Thai government has failed to propagate an alternative version of the history (Mansurnoor, 2005). As a result, Muslims in the region have not assimilated themselves into the Thai Buddhist majority, a number of rebellions have been suppressed by the Thai government throughout history, and many religious leaders and nationalists have been imprisoned. Moreover, a large number of Malay Muslims from the South have immigrated to Malaysia, and transmigrated to Bangkok through parts of Thailand.

The second factor contributing to the violent situation in the southern provinces is socio-economic inequality and low standards of education. According to Aphornsuvan, there is a perception among Malay Muslims that their ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic identities are threatened by the overbearing and insensitive Thai Buddhist state. In the region, the Islamic way of life comprises Malay and Yawi languages, inter-marriage with fellow Muslims in Malaysia, and religious education. Moreover, visits to Malaysia have reinforced a sense of Malay ethnicity among Thai Muslims (Aphornsuvan, 2007).

In addition, Jitpiromsri1 argues that Malay Muslims view themselves as second-class citizens due to the perceived state-sponsored threats to ethnic identity. They are politically marginalized by Bangkok, and are deprived of socio-economic benefits and denied access to educational and employment opportunities. Even though the Southern border provinces are not among the poorest in Thailand (some provinces in the north and northeastern have lower household incomes), there is high unemployment, especially among young Muslim males (Jitpiromsri, 2007: 89-111).

Jitpiromsri also commented that low standards of education in the region have produced only a few Malay Muslims assuming positions as local government officials as well as joining the local police. Therefore, these occupations are regularly taken by Buddhist Thais, who cannot properly communicate in the Malay language and have difficulty in understanding the identity, local values and mores. Ethno-religious factors may motivate the political struggle.

The third factor is inefficient governance and political injustices. Local governance in the south is dysfunctional because of allegedly corrupt and incompetent officials, often seen as interlopers with limited knowledge of the Yawi language and lacking in cultural under-

standing. As a result, local residents are frustrated with the government and their local officials in the area. The police, in particular, suffer from a negative reputation in the south, because of their alleged corrupt practices and for tendency to engage in unruly behavior with impunity (Phiphitthaphan, 2005b). Therefore, unless a conscious attempt is made to understand these grievances of the Malay-Muslim community and to implement appropriate policies, Muslim discontent is likely to continue and terrorism in southern Thailand will have implications for the rule of law (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Visualisation of the three elements at the root of the unrest in the south of Thailand (author's interpretation).



Government policies: implementation and effect

To understand Thai government policies towards the southern insurgency and violence, we have to understand government policy implementation in the past and its contribution to this issue. After the revolution of 1932, the Muslim communities in the three southern border provinces of Thailand faced difficulties in retaining their identity. The revolution was driven by the idea of people's sovereignty and was based on concepts such as "nationhood" and "citizenship." Subsequently, this led to attempts by the Thai government to establish the "Thai" nation, which comprised a national culture and an identity influenced by Buddhism and the concept of monarchy (Satha-Anand, 2007; Gilquin, 2005; Liow, 2004). In the lead-up to World War II,

the integration of other identities into this Thai identity saw new policies that combined policies of assimilation and an emphasis on centralized power in Bangkok (Phiphitthaphan, 2005a). Furthermore, this policy emphasized the transformation of Malay Muslims into Thai Muslims. While the Thai ultranationalist Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram was prime minister over 1938–1944, Islamic celebrations and religious holidays in the south were forbidden. Other aspects of Malay life, such as the wearing of traditional dress, were also curbed, while communication and teaching of the Yawi language, together with the practicing of Sharia law, were banned. In addition, Malay Muslims were encouraged to adopt Thai-sounding names. These measures dramatically raised dissatisfaction among the southern Muslim Malays (NRC, 2006). Not surprisingly, these assimilation policies were seen by Malay Muslims as an apparatus to threaten their cultural, religious and ethnic identity, resulting in Muslims strongly identifying themselves as "Malay" rather than "Thai." This caused hatred and resentment among the local Malay-Muslims. Malay identity, and cultural differences in the southern border provinces, would not have been a problem or a cause of conflict had the assimilation policy toward Malay Muslim population not been implemented.

After Phibun's return to power in 1948, the assimilation policy continued, prompting Haji Sulong, an Islamic scholar and representative of the local elites and Malay Muslim community at the time, to submit a series of political demands to the Thai government. These demands included self-government for the Deep South provinces, communication and education in the Malay language, preservation of Islamic identity, and the implementation of Sharia law. The central government rejected these proposals because a separatist ideology threatened state sovereignty (Aphornsuvan, 2007). To make matters worse, the authorities arrested Haji Sulong soon after. Satha-Anand rgues that the detention of the Muslim activist led to several uprisings, as well as the renowned Dusan Nyor Rebellion in which numerous Muslim Malay protestors died (Satha-Anand, 2007: 11-34). The Thai government issued an Emergency Decree in the region. These incidents considerably increased calls for the southern provinces to secede from Thailand. Some even advocated joining British-ruled Malaya.

When separatist sentiment reemerged in far-Southern Thailand in the 1960s, the Thai government responded with military and socio-

economic policies. The goals of the counter-insurgency strategy of the central government were the elimination of prejudice, and improved relations between local people and government officers. However, there was another major political crisis in that period. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) became a significant movement in the north and northeast regions. The insurgent movement in the south was considered less threatening (Smith, 2004). Nevertheless, the administration of the southern border provinces in that period was a significant source of discontent among the Malays. The majority of government officers posted to this region were Buddhist Thais with a poor understanding of the Malay Muslim identity and with a weak grasp of the local language, coupled with a cynical attitude towards the locals (Phiphitthaphan, 2005b; Thomas, 1975). Even though in the 1960s central government attempted to initiate some policies to placate the Malay community, the perception continued that the religious beliefs of the people of Southern Thailand continued to be ignored by policy makers.

A broad consensus maintains that the southern insurgency is fundamentally a political dispute which requires a political solution. During the 1980s, the Thai government recognized this and changed its military response to a political one which eventually succeeded in defeating the insurgency. The mastermind behind this change of strategy was General Prem Tinsulanonda, an officer from Songkhla Province who served as prime minister from 1980 to 1988 (Phiphitthaphan, 2006). When General Prem Tinsulanonda began his first term as prime minister in March 1980, the government accepted Muslim identity and religious rights, proposed a general amnesty bill for insurgents, implemented an economic development scheme for the Deep South, and improved interagency cooperation and coordination (McCargo, 2009b). In the early 1980s, the Prem Tinsulanonda government controlled the situation in the South and also constructed a proper association with the Malay-Muslim elite by improving government functions in several aspects such as governance, security, and financial arrangements.

One of the key essentials in this program was the establishment of more efficient administrative apparatus. In 1981, the Prem government established the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) to resolve the violence (Kaewdaeng, 2005). The SBPAC

succeeded in improving the situation in southern Thailand over the next two decades. As a result, the locals enjoyed a relatively peaceful existence. Incidents such as bombings and assassinations decreased. The SBPAC performed effectively due to its access to crucial information about the separatist movement and the establishment of positive relationships with the locals.

The success of the SBPAC was also due to other factors. Firstly, its headquarters were established at a strategically important location in the center of the troubled area, the Yala province (Kaewdaeng, 2005). The perceptions and the decisions of this agency were different and were more effective than agencies that had operated at a distance. Local people had better access. Secondly, the SBPAC was effective in receiving complaints and resolving conflicts, partly because it had the power to remove corrupt and incompetent officials. Grievances were not only actively dealt with by the SBPAC but were also prosecuted in a court of law (Phiphitthaphan, 2006). Finally, SBPAC has good relations with local intellectuals and community elites who shared information. To improve interagency cooperation and intelligence-gathering network, the SBPAC joined with the security wing known as the Civilian-Police-Military Unit 43 (CPM-43), which was in charge of security in the region. In general, the SBPAC and the CPM-43 enjoyed a reputation as just and reasonable organizations.

Other factors contributed to a reduction in tension during this period. The Thai monarch implemented a number of developmental projects in the South, funded the building and preservation of mosques, and built a summer palace in Narathiwat Province. The democratization of Thai politics in the 1980s gave the Malay-Muslim community a voice in government and resulted in the armed forces' withdrawal from politics in 1992. Malay Muslims had opportunities to enter the national political mainstream, especially through the Democrat Party and New Aspiration Party, which strengthened their position in the South by inducting a number of Malay-Muslim politicians.

In the 1990s, the elected government of prime minister Chuan Leekpai (Democratic Party) enacted a National Security Policy for the Deep South provinces, which was based on the concept of a "development as security." As a result of border security collaborations between the Thai and Malaysian governments, unrest decreased considerably in the region (Rahimmula, 2003). Although the situation in the South

was "relatively calm" in the late 1990s, a number of observers assumed that the insurgency was "on hold," waiting for suitable circumstances to reemerge.

Thaksin Shinawatra, who was prime minister from January 2001 until his removal by a military coup in September 2006, attempted to quell the turbulence in southern Thailand but provoked violent repercussions and stirred separatists into more violent operations aimed at government officers. Feelings of mutual mistrust between the Thai authorities and the Malay-Muslim communities deteriorated. The Thaksin government attempted to convince the public that the insurgent movement in the South had been eradicated, but the increase in violent acts under his tenure belied this claim.

Assassinations and bombings in 2001-2002 confirmed that separatist groups were still active, although Thaksin claimed that these incidents constituted nothing more than reprisals by criminal gangs and should not be attributed to separatists. After discussions between the Malaysian foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, and his Thai counterpart, Surakiart Sathirathai, it became clear that these attacks were the work of "terrorists and not bandits" (Smith, 2004). The Thai defense minister, Thammarak Issarangura, made a public statement almost immediately after incidents in January 2004, pointing out that the violent disturbances were far more than just petty crimes. These responses from members within the Thaksin government proved that there were political motivations behind these incidents, despite the initial denial. The government not only declared martial law in Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat, but Thaksin also dispatched 3,000 security forces under the command of Lieutenant General Phongsak Aekbansingha (commander of the Fourth Army). This was not a normal way to deal with outlaw groups or ordinary bandits.

The ouster of Thaksin on September 19, 2006, by an army-led bloodless coup was clearly a setback for democracy in Thailand and the wider Southeast Asian region. The coup raised expectations that the new regime might pursue a more effective and less hardline approach in the South. The coup leader and chairman of the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin, was a Thai Muslim (though not a Malay Muslim) who had voiced support for proposals by a National Reconciliation Commission's recommendations, and had disagreed with the blacklisting of insurgent suspects but urged

dialogue with the militants.

In early October 2006, the Council for National Security (CNS) appointed retired Gen. Surayud Chulanont as interim prime minister. A number of observers expected his government to implement policies aimed at national reconciliation and a reduction in violence. However, Gen. Surayud's administration did not implement any significant changes. According to Deep South Watch (DSW) (Jitpiromsri, 2010), an independent monitoring group based at the Prince of Songkhla University's Patani campus, the number of violent incidents (assassinations, arson and bomb attacks) rose dramatically after the coup (Figure 2) .

Figure 2: Deaths and injuries in the Southern violence, 2004-9 (Jitpiromsri and McCargo, 2010: 161).



Consequently, in 2008, the violent situation in the southern border provinces was one of the major challenges to the short-term governments of three prime ministers.2 From his first day in office, Abhisit Vejjajiva and his cabinet was not only strongly committed to bringing peace to the southern border provinces but also placed the situation at the top of the national political agenda (Deep South Watch, 2009a). It adopted a conciliatory approach based on political strategies rather than military solutions, emphasizing cultural diversity and multiculturalism rather than assimilation. However, while the Abhisit

government declared that it had successfully tackled the southern issue (McCartan, 2009), Deep South Watch argued that violence increased during the government's term (Deep South Watch, 2009b).

Though his government continued to make efforts to arrange negotiations with insurgent groups and considered proposals to set up a new ministry to deal specifically with the three southern provinces (McCartan and Crispin, 2008), words were not matched with actions, according to the International Crisis Group (2010). Although Abhisit Vejjajiva stressed that his government's policies in the south included improvements in educational standards and justice procedures, security measures and development projects were on the rise. However, these policies were hampered by political conflict between Vejjajiva's Democrat Party and supporters of the former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, which led to protracted and violent demonstrations in Bangkok. For this reason, the government was unable to fulfil its potential in tackling the problems in the South. However, Vejjajiva remained confident that his government had the capability to effectively tackle the issue, in the absence of positive signs that violence in the southern provinces was abating.

Separatist movements: Origin, ideologies and strategies

There are several components and actors in the southern insurgency. Several insurgent organizations are still active in the South, whilst others have renounced violence. This section will describe and analyze the origin of the separatist movements in the South, their organizational ideologies and their goals.

Dissatisfaction with the Thai authorities is a key factor which has exacerbated the conflict in the Deep South. Historical conflicts and government policies helped forge a consciousness of identity, which became a source for separatist ambitions. In 1947, a separatist movement fighting for an independent Patani, the Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR), or League of Malays of Great Patani, emerged as a crucial organization in the campaign for the unity of Malay communities in the southern border provinces. GAMPAR's objectives were to separate these provinces from Thailand for incorporation into the Federation of Malaya.3 Islam was of minor importance in its ideology (Che Man, 1990). Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddeen was the leader of

this group in association with other aristocratic Malays who had lost influence due to the imposition of central authority from Bangkok in the early part of the century (Satha-Anand, 1986). In the early stages of the resistance movement, the Thai authorities were intent on countering Malay national ideology. This resistance movement was comprised mainly of elites—Malays with royal connections and aristocratic lineage—rather than being a grassroots movement.

The resistance against Thai authority was most intense during the 1960s and 1970s, with more than sixty militant groups operating among the Malay communities. The main victims of this resistance were both government officials and the armed forces (McCargo, 2009b; Melvin, 2007). The Barisan Revolusi Nasionale (BRN - National Revolutionary Front) was formed by Ustaz Karim Hajji Hassan (Che Man, 1990). The BRN married its separatist doctrine with a socialist ideology, and cooperated with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on the other side of the border during the 1950s. The BRN was most active in the 1970s and early 1980s, but then split into BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Congress and BRN-Ulama (ICG, 2005). After the split, the goals of the groups did not change significantly. The BRN-Coordinate expanded and earned support through some Pondoks (traditional Islamic schools). The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), which was formed in 1959 by Tengku Abdul Jalal (Pitsuwan, 1982), placed Islam at the center of its ideology and attempted to garner support from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other Arab organizations. Violent clashes between insurgents and security forces became the norm in the Thailand's southern border provinces following the establishment of this movement.

The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) or Pertubohan Persatuan Pembebasan Patanim, formed by Tungku Bira Kotanil, emerged in the late 1960s as a rebel organization whose main agenda was to re-establish Patani as an wholly independent state. Islam was central to the PULO's doctrine of "fight[ing] for the freedom of Patani and the emergence of an Islamic Republic" (Satha-Anand, 1986). The religion of "Islam" was used as a major ideology in PULO's doctrine rather than the conception of "Malay" national identity. There was friction within the PULO organization, leading to the formation of "New PULO" in 1995 by A-rong Muleng and Haji Abdul

Rohman Bazo (Gunaratna *et al.*, 2005). However, the aims of this splinter group were similar to those of the original organization. A strategic coalition between the BRN and PULO factions also emerged during this period (ICG, 2005). According to Storey (2010: 38),

> From the late 1950s onward, these groups and subsequent splinter groups waged a low-intensity insurgency against the Thai authorities, assassinating police and army personnel, civil servants and Thai Buddhist settlers, and bombing and torching state symbols, particularly schools that were perceived as tools of the Thai state designed to "brainwash' Malay Muslims and convert them into Buddhists.

Another newly-emerged group that has espoused a strong Islamic identity is the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP). Although all these militant separatist movements have secession from Thailand as their goal, their ideologies and philosophies along with their political motivations are significantly varied. In the last several years, these militant separatist organizations have forged an umbrella alliance named Bersatu (Unity) (Gunaratna et al., 2005). The confrontations between Thai officials and Muslim separatist movements remained throughout the 1960s and 1970s at a fairly high level of violence (Mahakanjana, 2006). There are two major strategies which were used by radical insurgents such as BRN-C and GMIP: first, to destroy unity and create a suspicious atmosphere between Buddhists and Muslims in the region, provoking Thai Buddhists to relocate away from the area; second, to deconstruct local government in the region and reconstruct it by their movement. Some observers argue that if these strategies are successful, independence may come to Patani. However, another group of observers believe that even if these strategies are successful, it will merely lead to the establishment of greater autonomy in Patani, rather than full independence.

Impacts and Conclusion

The violence in the south of Thailand has impacted the region in several ways. The fourth part of this paper will explore and analyzes

the impacts of the conflict locally and nationally. Since January 2004, the insurgents have been quite successful in targeting the Thai authorities, especially the police, army and other civilian government officials, including government school teachers. The militants have burned down local schools and assassinated teachers, not only because they are perceived as state symbols and unarmed targets, but also because of the pervasive suspicion that they are active participants in the alleged indoctrination of Malay-Muslim children on the issue of Thai authority. Thousands of children, both Thai Buddhist and Malay, in the southern border provinces have been affected by the violence. These children have been prevented from accessing good education and their academic development has been hampered by a lack of proper facilities (Jitpiromsri, 2010; see also HRW, 2007; HRW, 2010). Even where schoolchildren receive a good education, they lack the career opportunities available to Thai students in other provinces. Moreover, they are also easily persuaded to collaborate with the separatist movement or are paid to commit violent acts within their communities.

The education in the region has been severely disrupted by separatist insurgent activities, causing classes to be suspended and frequently disrupted. Approximately 1000 teachers have petitioned the Education Ministry for relocation to more secure areas and more than 40 percent have had their requests granted (Abdus Sabur, 2005). In addition, Abdus Sabur also notes that teachers, frequently the target for assassinations, require protection and are unwilling to visit their students in the community out of concern for their personal safety. Because of all these factors, economic incentives are not able to persuade teachers to work in the region.

Violent insurgency has caused damage to Thai governmental and economic infrastructure in the south, creating mistrust among Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims alike, causing high numbers of Buddhists to flee. Insurgents have also attempted to increase tension between the two communities by assassinating Buddhist monks and attacking Buddhist temples (McCargo, 2009b).

The economic system and infrastructure in the region has been severely affected by militant attacks. Even though the government has doubled the budget spent in the south, the implementation of infrastructure projects is problematic in such an unstable environment (Jitpiromsri, 2010). One of the government's critical missions is to

rebuild trust and mobilize local people to assist remedial projects and development schemes. The continued unrest is dissuading the business community from investing and working in Deep South provinces. This factor limits the prospects for economic growth and employment, contributing to a rise in poverty in the region (Jitpiromsri, 2007: 89-111). Furthermore, many of those killed are breadwinners, resulting in further hardship and deepening poverty. Children and widows, affected by the loss of husband and father respectively, require specialized assistance to help recover from such traumatic events.

In summary, since January 2004, the unrest has greatly affected government officials and civilians, Buddhists and Muslims. Economic development and investment in the region have been disrupted, and the local educational system has been severely disrupted. Many women have become widows and countless children are now orphans. They require counselling to overcome the trauma and suffering brought on by these events.

Even though no particular insurgent group has voiced any clear demands, a separation of the three southern provinces from Thai sovereignty, to establish an independent Islamic state, is believed to be their major goal. This is obviously opposed by the Thai state. Some have suggested that perhaps a less radical option can be found, with the Thai state granting wider autonomy to the Muslims in the area. However, observers believe that autonomy may eventually lead to demands for full independence (McCargo, 2010). Numerous scholars have proposed self-government models for the south (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo, 2008), but none has been implemented.

There is a belief that implementing these models may be a stepping stone to future demands for full independence. Some scholars maintain that if Thai authorities had considered granting autonomy to the three southern provinces in 2004, or even earlier, an escalation of violence might have been prevented. Alternatively, it has also been proposed that if autonomy had been granted and the violent insurgency continued, then the separatists may not have demanded full independence. However, central government's response has not involved any discussion of autonomy or extraordinary governance. Unless the central government succeeds to win the hearts and minds of people by their strategy, this violent insurgency is likely to continue.

Endnotes

1 Director of the Deep South Watch and Center for the Study of Conflict and Cultural Diversity (CSCC).

2 The three prime ministers were: Samak Sundaravej (1935-2009), from January to September 2008; Somchai Wongsawat; and Abhisit Vejjajiva from late 2008 to the general elections in July 2011.

3 The Federation of Malaya comprised 11 states and existed from 1 February 1948 until 16 September 1963.

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China's economic integration and new Chinese migrants in the Mekong region

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Abstract—This paper is based on the findings from fieldwork conducted in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) in 2013 and 2014, and argues that the movement of new Chinese migration is an integral part of China's capital flow of investment, trade and economic aid. These four Mekong countries are ideally placed to receive Chinese migrants, because capital flow from China has steadily increased in line with the strengthening of ties between China and the CLMV countries, where new Chinese migrants can access the existing social networks created by the local ethnic Chinese. It is important for CLMV countries to establish a legal channel of recruitment for immigrant workers, to ensure a bilateral and inter-state cooperation in labor migration management.

Keywords: CLMV; new Chinese migrants; Mekong region; economic integration; capital flow; labor cooperation.

Introduction

Chinese migration to the Mekong region has increased rapidly in recent years, following the development of a strong economic relationship between China and the region. Early in the 21st century, Chinese companies invested billions of dollars in the Mekong countries, focusing on infrastructure development, resource-exploitation, agricultural sector and cultural expansion, which is accompanied by the opening up of Chinese educational institutions in the region. The flow of human capital from China to the Mekong countries has

Asian Review 28(2), 2015, pp. 75–104.

evolved in parallel with capital flows.

Although Chinese international migration is interpreted as a succession of domestic migration trends (Kuhn, 2009), the consequence of domestic pressures that occur within Chinese society such as a high unemployment and rural-underemployment and the rapid increase of the "floating population" (Rallu, 2002), there is an increasing trend looking at the close nexus between the rising of China's economic role and new migration movement and other economic flows as well as the policies that influence them (Xerogiani, 2006; Zhuang and Wang, 2010: 174; Chong, 2013; Nyíri Pál, 2013).

In this article, the new migration from China to the Mekong region is scrutinized in the context of China's increasing economic-political influences to the region, and the special relations between the Mekong countries and China. The discussion aims to capture the complexity of the new Chinese migration to CLMV countries, the patterns, trends and the local policy responses.

China's economic expansion in the Mekong region

The economic reform of 1978 turned China from a poor, socialist and isolated nation into the new "workshop of the world," an accolade previously bestowed on Britain during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century. The "go-out strategy" launched by the Chinese Communist Party early in the 21st century encouraged the emerging "Red capitalists" to invest abroad, with the aim of exploiting the natural resources and energy to feed the demands of domestic industries. Outward foreign direct investments (FDI) and economic cooperation between China and the Mekong region countries are the driving factors influencing the flow of migration to this area.

For some time China has harbored a strong interest in forging close relations with the Mekong countries, but only in the last decade or so has its leadership been able to push forward a comprehensive cooperation and socio-economic influence in this region. China has promoted and increased its economic and political relations with the CLMV countries since the 1990s and, furthermore, has gradually become their largest economic partner. A report published by China's National Development and Reform Commission (2011) on the 2008 summit of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) countries states

that since the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2010, bilateral trade between China and the GMS countries has gained a momentum of greater development, with a further improved trade structure and fast increase in bilateral investment. This report further notes that bilateral trade and Chinese investments in the GMS countries have reached the highest levels recorded in 2010. In comparison with 2008, China's bilateral trade with Cambodia and Thailand increased by just 28 percent, while its trade with Vietnam, Myanmar and Lao PDR increased respectively by 54 percent, 68 percent and 150 percent.

China's main exports to the GMS countries were textiles, electromechanical products, hi-tech products, garments, steel and agricultural products, while its main imports from these countries included raw materials such as natural rubber, garments, timber, coal, crude oil, agricultural products and various types of minerals. Chinese companies also actively invested in the Mekong countries and its main industries are quite similar, including textiles, light industry, machinery, electronics, building materials and chemicals.

Bilateral China-GMS trade grew rapidly from early in the 21st century, with Thailand showing the largest increase in volume (see Tables 1 and 2).

Several GMS countries have had a severe trade deficit with China, particularly acute in the case of Vietnam from 2001 onwards, climbing from $188 million in 2001 to $16.4 billion in 2012. Thailand is no exception. In 2010, Thailand had a trade deficit with China totaling US$13.45 billion (Van Chinh, 2015). While China's share of each CMS country's trade is large, ranging from 10 to 25 percent, the share of GMS countries in China's foreign trade is only around 1 percent.

The general trend in China-GMS trade relations is growing dependence of the Mekong region market on China. If the economic relations between the GMS countries and China were to decline, the effect on the GMS countries would be far greater than the consequences suffered by China.

China officially became the FDI provider to GMS countries in 2000, when the country's Communist Party launched the "going-out" policy, which actively encouraged and supported investment activities overseas to utilize domestic and foreign resources and markets. By 2012, China had become the largest foreign investor in Myanmar,

Table 1. Bilateral trade between China and GMS countries (1992-2010) (US$100m)

Year	Cambodia	Myanmar	Lao PDR	Thailand	Vietnam
1992	0.13	3.90		13.19	1.79
1995	0.57	7.67	0.54	33.63	10.52
1998	1.62	5.80	0.26	36.72	12.46
2001	2.40	6.32	0.62	70.50	28.15
2004	4.82	11.45	1.14	173.43	67.40
2007	9.33	20.6	2.49	346.38	151.15
2010	14.41	44.4	10.55	529.37	254.0

Source: Lu Guangsheng, 2012, pp. 5–6.

Table 2. Trade growth rate between China and GMS countries (%)

Year	Cambodia	Myanmar	Lao PDR	Thailand	Vietnam
1993	49.3	25.4	n.a	2.5	122.6
1995	58.1	49.8	34.4	66.2	97.4
2000	39.9	22.2	28.8	57.1	87.1
2004	50.5	6.3	03.7	37.0	45.4
2007	27.3	40.9	14.2	24.9	51.9
2010	52.6	53.2	40.3	38.6	20.7

Source: Lu Guangsheng, 2012: 12-13.

Laos and Cambodia, and the fifth largest investor in Thailand. In the first 11 months of the 2012-13 financial year, China was leading the FDI inflow in Laos with over $1.33 billion worth of projects. The year-to-year trading figures between China and Laos climbed from 38 percent in 2005 to 174 percent in 2013. By 2013, China had invested a total of $14.1 billion across 52 projects in Myanmar, accounting for 41.7 percent of this newly-liberalized country's cumulative FDI. This amount excludes investments from Hong Kong, where many subsid-

iaries of Chinese companies are registered. For Myanmar, in 2008 Earth Rights International identified at least 69 Chinese multinational corporations involved in a total of 90 projects in hydropower, oil and natural gas, mining, jade and other natural resources.

In 2011, Chinese investments accounted for 60 percent of the total approved FDI for Cambodia. The size of the approved FDI from China continued to rise by 62 percent, reaching $427 million in 2013, compared to $263 million in 2012. By 2013, China had become the largest investor in terms of cumulative FDI in Cambodia, which stood at $9.6 billion in total from 1994 to 2013 (Xinhua Agency, 2014). The majority of large-scale investments are from the Chinese Central Enterprises targeting infrastructure, energy and mining sectors, coupled with projects in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Besides outward FDI, China is also the largest source of loans and aid. In April 2013, the visit of Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen brought home $2 billion of loans and aid from China, followed by a further interest-free loan of $33 million. Chinese companies are very active in tapping the hydropower market in Cambodia, which is expected to generate 77 percent of Cambodia's total electric generating capacity by 2030 (IHLO, 2014).

Chinese companies began expanding their investments in Thailand early in the 1990s. For the 1995-2003 period, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) registered FDI inflow of $114.9 million from China. As reported by Thailand's Board of Investment (BOI), 161 investment projects by Chinese companies were approved for the 1987-2005 period, with a total value of 31,505.7 million baht[2] (Suvakunta, 2007).

FDI from China to Vietnam is not as large as inflows from other international investors, although it has been constant. Over the 2002-2009 period, Chinese investments into Vietnam increased from $2.5 billion to $56.5 billion (Huang and Wilkes 2011). Most of these investments consist of funding for large-scale engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) projects.[3] EPC projects can also be seen as a special investment from China, which appear as a form of governmental support for its national investor. This is the method preferred by Vietnamese investors since the Chinese government has created a special policy of preferential buyer's credit and concessional loans for EPC projects, which stipulates that the necessary equipment and technologies must be sourced from China. By the end of 2009, Chinese

engineering companies were involved in projects worth $15.42 billion, making Vietnam their largest EPC market in Southeast Asia (Le Hong Hiep, 2013).

Although Chinese investment activities in GMS countries are diverse, they tend to converge on three major sectors: mining and resource extractions; land concessions; and infrastructure construction.

Taking advantage of low infrastructure development in the Mekong region, Chinese companies applied the policy called "land for infrastructure" and were welcomed by local authorities. Typical example for this practice is the case of Lao PDR. When the decision was made for Laos to host the XXV Southeast Asian Games in December 2009, the Lao government sought aid from the China Development Bank by applying for a loan to fund the necessary sporting facilities. The $100 million loan was awarded on the condition that the Chinese company Suzhou Industrial Park Overseas Investment would be given a 50-year lease to develop 1,640 hectares of central Vientiane into a "modern town," complete with business centers, hotels, factories and tourism facilities. This is perhaps the largest amount of tied aid linked to the Chinese government and may have led to the most well-known case of trade-offs that Laos has made in the name of development (Kenney-Lazar, 2012). Consequently, it was agreed to bring 50,000 Chinese nationals into Lao PDR to populate the new satellite city. Together with this "New City Development Project," the China Yunnan Construction Engineering Company Group Corporation also imported thousands of Chinese workers to build the SEA Games stadium in Vientiane. The Lao government estimates that about 30,000 Chinese nationals already live in Laos, but "most analysts believe the real figure to be perhaps ten times higher. Stores owned and operated by Chinese people have sprung up across northern Laos, while other Chinese have settled into remote villages as foremen and workers on commercial agriculture projects" (McCartan, 2008).

The relationship with the Mekong region countries bordering with China—Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam—is strategic and important for China. China enjoys a long border with these countries and has easy access by road to natural resources. Chinese companies in the CLMV countries have gradually shifted their focus to the energy, resource extraction, infrastructure and agriculture sectors in areas close to the

border with China. Chinese financiers have also moved into the region to take advantage of the favorable investment climate and the abundance of natural resources. Vietnam and Laos, and to a lesser extent Cambodia, are experiencing an unprecedented interest in exploiting their bauxite resources. The Lao mining industry (bauxite, copper, gold, lignite, tin, iron, zinc, gypsum), in particular, has been the main interest of Chinese investment over the last decade, responsible for more than 50 percent of Chinese FDI into the country. In 2008, there were 113 foreign companies operating in this sector, of which 33 were from China (Lazarus, 2009). Much of the demand is driven by China's need to feed its growing industry, and these Mekong countries are perfectly situated to bring the product to the market (Lazarus, 2009).

From the 2000s onwards, Chinese companies became particularly interested in land concession projects, many of which were granted to Chinese companies in order to increase agricultural and mining production. Concessions for 2-3 million hectares of land were granted (including domestic projects), representing up to 13 percent of Lao PDR's total land area, in which the main investors are neighboring countries like China, Vietnam and Thailand (GTZ, 2009).

The economic relationship between Laos and China is expanding. Currently, numerous provinces in the north of Laos function as economic zones for the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. Contract farming, especially for rubber plantations, forms a considerable part of the business ventures between the two countries. The massive expansion of rubber plantations by Chinese companies in north Laos stems from a mix of market demand and land constraints in China, as well as political incentives from both the Lao and Chinese governments (Haberecht, 2009). Many new Chinese investors supplied Lao farmers with seeds and inputs for commercial production of sugarcane and rubber crops. As a result, competition for swidden (slash and burn) and fallow forests intensified, altering not only upland communities' customary relationship with land and resources, but challenging the resource management framework established during the 1990s.

A similar situation is happening in Cambodia. In 1995-2009, the Cambodian government granted 186,935 hectares of land to Chinese companies for 17 agricultural projects. The largest project took possession of an area of 10,000 hectares of land, 18 percent of a total 1,024,639 hectares of land granted to the economic organiza-

tions (Hem, 2013).

Capital flows from China into the Mekong region through bilateral trade, outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) and EPC projects, are facilitating the inflows of new waves of Chinese migrants into the Mekong region, as will be discussed in the next section.

New Chinese migrants in the Mekong region

Southeast Asia may be home to as many as 40 million people of Chinese descent (New World Encyclopaedia, 2003), whose ancestors migrated to the area mostly from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. The statistics vary according to the sources and definition of "Overseas Chinese. " The New World Encyclopaedia, for instance, defines Overseas Chinese as people of Chinese birth or descent "who live outside the Greater China region, which includes territories administered by the rival governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)."[4] The same source estimates that the overseas Chinese population is 7.1 million in Thailand, 1.3 million in Myanmar, 1.2 million in Vietnam, in excess of 150,000 in Cambodia and around 50,000 in Laos. The ethnic Chinese, therefore, constitute more than 10 percent of Thailand's population, which World Bank figures put at 67.9 million for 2015.[5] For the CLMV countries, the ethnic Chinese constitute 1-3 percent of the total population (SyCip, 2001). Notwithstanding their minority status, people of Chinese descent are known to play a dominant role in the economies of the region.

Recent waves of Chinese immigration into the Mekong region, particularly in Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand, are playing an important role in China's economic engagement with the GMS. From the 1990s to the present, the Chinese community in Cambodia has grown to over 2 million, out of a total population of approximately 50 million. In Myanmar, 40 percent of the population in Mandalay province is identified as ethnic Chinese. The recent immigrants to the region are thought to have close link with the Chinese mainland and its capital inflow. In their *Migration and Trade* (2010), Chinese researchers Zhuang and Wang from Xiamen University claim that in the last 25 years, the number of Chinese migrant arrivals in the Mekong region has reached 2.3-2.6 million, most of them labeled as

"floating people."[6] These temporary residents tend to work as hawkers, traders, farmers, technicians, laborers, staff, teachers, artists and investors, with hawkers and traders representing the majority.

The Mekong region countries are China's neighbors, historically the place of origin of large ethnic Chinese communities, which could be construed as a factor that draws interest from the new Chinese migrants. With the much improved infrastructure connecting the Chinese economic centers in Yunnan, Quangxi and Quangdong with the Mekong region, new Chinese migrants can reach these countries with fewer logistical challenges, particularly in an economic climate stimulated by increased commercial interaction between China and these neighboring countries.

Cambodia

In Cambodia, people of Chinese descent are referred to as *Khmer kat Chen* or simply *Chen*. Under French colonial rule, the largest Chinese groups were from Hokkien and Canton, but Teochiu[7] had become the largest group by the mid-20th century. Though the ethnic Chinese community in Cambodia experienced both abuse and assimilation, it displayed remarkable resilience in adapting, responding and contesting the forces that tried to marginalize its members (Chan, 2012).

Until 1970, the overseas Chinese were the largest minority in Cambodia, numbering an estimated 425,000, a figure that by 1984 had dwindled to 61,000. Recently, however, the Chinese bilingual magazine Khmer Economy Magazine estimated that about one million ethnic Chinese may reside in Cambodia.[8] A portion of these ethnic Chinese are descendants from settlers who migrated from southern China centuries ago, while others are arrivals from recent waves of migration.

Following the establishment of the State of Cambodia (SOC) as a transitional period until the restoration of the monarchy (1989-1993), Chinese education was restored in Cambodia, which was considered a step towards improved Sino-Cambodian ties. In December 1991, the Cambodian National Assembly accepted the re-establishment of the Khmer-Chinese Association in Cambodia, the first time that an Overseas Chinese Association had been officially recognized since 1973. This event could be seen as a turning point for the Khmer-Chinese of

Cambodia, who can now count on state legislation for their business and cultural activities, as well as education opportunities. Since then, the Overseas Chinese Association of Cambodia has grown rapidly. Presently, it has 22 branch offices in 24 provinces and around 140 offices at the district and commune levels (Siphat, 2015). These organizations are authorized to form their own associations, and to build temples, schools and cemeteries for the Chinese community. In 2000, overseas Chinese in Cambodia set up *Chean Fra Media*, a Chinese newspaper headed by *Oknha* Duong Ch'hiv, Chairman of the Khmer Chinese Association. The newspaper's aims are to promote Chinese culture and education in Cambodia. In his position as a prominent figure in Cambodia, Ch'hiv collected funds from the Khmer-Chinese communities to build schools and to raise support for the poor and victims of natural disasters in Cambodia and China.[9] The Chinese-language teachers were invited to come and teach Khmer-Chinese students at the schools run by the association. Chinese culture and education was also supported by the Phnom Penh branch of the Bank of China, through a special fund set up for this purpose, to "not only contribute to developing the Cambodian economy but also [to] assist the country's education." This level of political support by the Cambodian government can help explain why Cambodia absorbed a high number of new Chinese migrants, which contributed to the revival of the local ethnic Chinese community.

New Chinese migration into Cambodia began around the 1990s, particularly after the Khmer-Chinese Association was set up. Although new Chinese migrants into the country are diverse, they can be categorized into two major groups: namely, spontaneous migrants and organized migrants. Spontaneous migrants include petty traders, hawkers, traditional healers, farmers, marriage migrants and small-scale business people who moved to the Kingdom in search of better opportunities. They travelled to Cambodia by independent means, running their own business and shouldering all risks. Soon enough, Chinese cheap goods and technologies followed them to Cambodia. They set up businesses or obtained employment through networks with local Khmer-Chinese citizens or local Chinese associations. These small-scale business people displayed a high degree of mobility, in that they would remain if their business prospered but did not hesitate to move out of Cambodia in search of better opportunities. Their movements involve

frequent trips between Cambodia and their homeland in China.

The second group of organized migrants includes contracted workers, project managers, technicians, representative office staff, teachers, students and so on. Most of them work as salaried employees for Chinese companies with investment or contract projects in Cambodia. The National Bureau of Statistics of China reported that between 1995 and 2005, in the region of 43,070 Chinese technicians and laborers were brought to Cambodia for work (Zhuang and Wang, 2010). They include two sub-groups: manual laborers recruited to work on the contracted projects or land concessions granted to Chinese companies; and professionals and people with higher education who work for Chinese investments, projects, representative offices and Chinese schools.

By Cambodian law, new Chinese migrants who meet requirements can apply for Cambodian citizenship. Although no official statistics are available, during our fieldwork in Cambodia, at a number of locations we met dozens of recent migrants who had been granted Cambodian citizenship. Among the numerous Chinese employees who successfully applied for Cambodian citizenship, we were impressed by the circumstances surrounding a Mr. Lam, a 38-year old who had arrived in Cambodia from his native Kunming (Yunnan) in 2005. In Kunming, he served as a soldier and upon his discharge from the army, decided to migrate to Cambodia. Once in the Kingdom, for the first two years he worked in a garment factory but left in 2007 when a Chinese company in the Tong Min Group received a concession of 30,000 hectares of forestland for a 70-year lease. Mr. Lam applied for work and was recruited as administrative manager for this large land concession, based in Cambodia's Mondolkiri province. Mr. Lam enjoys a high salary and the relatively low living costs in Cambodia allow him to make regular savings. He visits his homeland once a year for 15 days. He married a local Khmer woman, herself an employee of the Chinese company, and they now have a child together. Mr. Lam believes that Cambodian citizenship will improve his personal status, enabling him to travel freely between China and Cambodia. In our interview, Mr. Lam stated that new Chinese migrants enjoy good relations in their host country and this is drawing many Chinese investors and workers into the Kingdom. In his opinion, though life and work in Cambodia are easy and less competitive than in China, to

succeed in Cambodia a business person needs a powerful local backer, and must embrace certain unofficial local practices renowned for their ability to oil the wheels of business.

We argue that the greater the number of Chinese companies to be awarded projects by Cambodian investors, the greater the number of Chinese migrants likely to move into the country to find jobs as project managers, workers and brokers for Chinese investors. With the increasing flow of Chinese capital under the name of investment and aid, there is high demand for materials and equipment for construction projects to be managed by Chinese companies, and consequently, large groups of Chinese workers and technicians are likely to follow this flow of capital into Cambodia. By way of example, in 2007, hydroelectric power accounted for less than 4 percent of Cambodia's 386 MW of energy-generating capacity, a level expected to rise to 77 percent by 2030 (U. S. Energy Information Administration (2013). To date, much of Cambodia's hydroelectric power expansion has been financed by China. In December 2010, Sinohydro, a Chinese state-owned hydropower engineering and construction firm, completed the construction of the 184 MW Kamchay Dam project at a cost of $280 million, with financing from the Export-Import Bank of China. Separately, at a cost of $1 billion, China is sponsoring the construction of two mega-dams, Stung Tatay and Stung Russey, which upon completion will be among Cambodia's largest hydroelectric power projects.[10] Cambodia plans to build ten dams between 2010 and 2019, adding 2,045 MW of capacity. Chinese entities are providing financing for six of these dams.

Since entry of new Chinese migrants into Cambodia is facilitated by Khmer-Chinese associations, this organization plays an important role in connecting new and old Chinese migrants on Cambodian soil. A society named Oknha was established by Khmer Chinese citizens, named after an honorific title bestowed by the Cambodian monarch to honor a chosen few. The title of *oknha* can be acquired by means of a donation of $100,000 and a commitment to devolve funds towards the greater good. A recent estimate puts the number of *oknha* in Cambodia at just over 700, a significant increase from the 20 such titles recorded in 2004.[11]

Lao PDR

The Chinese population in Laos has historically been smaller than the Chinese communities in other GMS countries. Although Laos shares a common border with Yunnan province, most of today's ethnic Chinese in Laos originate from the southern provinces of China, including Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan, and settled in Laos around the second half of the 19th century. The Chinese accounted for 32,500 individuals in 1955, most of whom were Teochiu, followed by Hakka, Hainanese and Cantonese. They owned around 50 percent (749 out of 1550) of the companies registered in Laos in 1959, although their economic influence carried more weight, as many were operating in Lao-Chinese joint ventures or under false Lao ownership (Halpern, 1961: 12-13; Tan, 2012: 61-94). By the 1980s, the Chinese population in Laos had fallen to around 10,000 but is now on the increase. The Overseas Community Affair Council, Republic of China (Taiwan) gives a figure of around one hundred and fifty thousand Chinese living in Laos. This estimate may include both older generations of ethnic Chinese, who settled in Laos in the mid-19th century, as well as new arrivals from the 1990s. Other sources indicate that the number of long-term Chinese residents could reach 30,000 for the whole of Laos, of which up to 4,000 are in Vientiane, the capital city. The number of new Chinese arrivals has been estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 (Chang and Cheng, 2015). It is hard to obtain reliable data on the real figure of Chinese people in Laos, since new arrivals are highly mobile, with large numbers returning to their native China after crossing into one of the northern Lao provinces for short periods of time. Lao administration systems, at all levels, are experiencing difficulties in obtaining official data and reports from local authorities.[12]

The revival of the overseas Chinese community in Laos is believed to stem from the new waves of immigrants arriving in the late 1990s on a scale that "the country had never experienced before" (Evans, 2008). Most of these new Chinese migrants arrived and settled in the north of Laos and in the capital Vientiane, where many construction projects were granted to Chinese companies. An ADB (Asian Development Bank) research project places the figure at 80,000 Chinese nationals working on Chinese-led projects (ADB, 2010). Available sources of information on specific locations also show that the

number of Chinese workers in northern Laos has increased dramatically. For example, in 2002, only 27 Chinese workers were recorded in the construction sector in Bokeo province but by 2007, the number officially registered by the provincial authorities was 1,269 Chinese nationals (Tan, 2011: 154).

In many cases, Chinese migration to Laos is investment-linked, ranging from small shopkeepers' investments in their own stock, to Chinese multinational companies' investments in large-scale rubber plantations. From mining to rubber, transport, hydropower stations, and hospitality infrastructure like hotels and casinos, China has now invested heavily in several key economic sectors in Laos. At the smaller scale, Chinese investments in Laos, and their concomitant influx of laborers, since the mid-2000s have also encouraged the arrival of spontaneous migrants who work as small traders, businesspeople, and farmers. They come in search of better prospects in a developing country. To better understand the situation of contemporary Chinese migration to Laos, we analyze three projects: the Golden Boten City, the construction of Route No. 3 on the North-South corridor, and the Hong Yue Market in Vientiane capital, referred to as the "new Chinatown."

Golden Boten City is located on the border opposite the Chinese town of Mohan. Visitors to Boten may be forgiven for thinking that most of its inhabitants speak Mandarin Chinese as their native language. In 2002, the Golden Boten City "special zone" was built on a 1,640 hectare free-trade zone, developed on a land concession project granted to a Chinese company and leased for up to 90 years. The vision of the Chinese investors for Golden Boten City was of a border town suitable for conventions, entertainment and sporting events, alongside business and transport centers that would become a trade hub in the region. The first project was a casino and hotel complex inaugurated in January 2007, which brought thousands of people from the People's Republic of China (PRC) into Boten every week. A few years later the Golden Boten City turned into an enclave of near lawlessness and was closed down in 2010.[13]Another special economic zone appears to be replacing the Golden Boten City. Located in the Lao district of Tonpheung, Bokeo province, the Ton Pheung Special Economic Zone is built on an area of 867 hectares of land leased for a 50-year period (renewable lease) to the Chinese entity Myanmar Macao Lundun Co.,

which in 2009 employed over 1,000 workers, mostly Chinese (Tan, 2011: 375).

Route 3 is a 246 km road connecting Golden Boten City at the Lao-PRC border with Houayxai, on the bank of the Mekong in the province of Bokeo and opposite the Thai town of Chiang Khong. In December 2002, the ADB approved a $30 million loan to the Lao government, for improvements to this road cutting through northwest Laos and feeding into an international North–South corridor linking Thailand and the PRC, with the Thai and Chinese governments co-financing the project to the tune of $30 million each. The upgrading began in March 2008 and after two years of construction, the road now links two of the poorest provinces in north Laos (Luang Namtha and Bokeo) with the region's most dynamic economies, the southern region of China and Thailand. The completion of Route 3 has improved goods transportation and increased people's mobility. The number of people crossing in and out of the Lao PDR at Route 3 border points has increased significantly since the mid-2000s. Research by Lyttleton indicates that "at the PRC-Lao PDR border point of Boten, 13,433 people entered Laos in 1999 and 15,799 people entered in 2003. In 2006, however, 56,507 people (including 51,833 people from the PRC) crossed into Lao PDR at Boten. In addition, travelers and businesspeople from the PRC are increasingly travelling further into the Lao PDR on visas. In 2005, 9,851 people from the PRC entered Laos via Boten on passport visas (compared with 35,473 people on border passes). In 2006, this figure increased by 47 percent, with 14,449 people from the PRC using visas (compared with 37,244 people on border passes)" (Lyttleton, 2009: 6).

Hong Yue Market is another example of the pairing between Chinese money and manpower and the Lao government's open-door policy to foreign investments. The Hong Yue Market, formerly known locally as "Talat [market] Leng" and now the "New Chinatown," is located in the town center and was built by the Hong Yue Chinese state company on land leased for 25 years. The market contains 110 shop spaces and was inaugurated in 1996. Up to 1998, the Lao government invited Hong Yue to bring more small entrepreneurs from the PRC and 97 small traders came and settled in Vientiane, taking over shop spaces previously left empty. Most of the traders and shopkeepers were from Hunan, while others were from Zhejiang and Jiangxi. Together

with the Hong Yue market, in 2008 the Chinese company Sanjiang opened the Sanjiang Market, a much larger shopping mall located on the road leading to Vientiane airport. The new shopping mall was built at a cost of $6 million. The new Chinatown has expanded the reach of Vientiane capital further north, and this shopping mall has absorbed more Chinese migrants into the Lao capital.

The new Chinese migrants in Laos hail from different Chinese regions, not only the southern provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong, but also Sichuan, Hunan and Shejiang. The new Mekong economic corridor linking Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, to Bangkok, via the completion of Route 3, has encouraged Chinese investors and businessmen to explore new and potential markets in Laos. Small traders also come to Laos along new paved feeder roads that reach previously inaccessible rural areas, to operate stalls in local markets, transporting their goods (easy-to-carry cheap consumer products) to places where they are likely to encounter less competition, particularly from other Chinese migrants. Chinese migrants have become important economic actors in these localities, as they are often involved in various business activities and create jobs for local people. However, Chinese investments, and their concomitant influx of laborers and traders, are also causing some anxiety and resentment among Lao citizens, particularly in land concession areas where large stretches of land have been granted to Chinese companies, forcing local people to alter their livelihoods.

Myanmar

Myanmar has historically been an attractive destination for Chinese migrants. Throughout the era of British colonial rule, migrants arrived, including nationals deserting China's political and economic upheavals of the 20th century, such as the Sino-Japanese War and the long civil war. The majority of ethnic Chinese in Myanmar originate from Yunnan, Guangdong and Fujian provinces. For the first half of the 20th century, ethnic Chinese residing in Myanmar enjoyed peace and stability. The anti-Chinese riots of 1967 were followed by a campaign of assimilation under the "Burmese Way to Socialism," which forced overseas Chinese to integrate more deeply into mainstream Myanmar society. Estimates by Than and Khin Maung Kyi (1997: 118) indicated that by 1983, Myanmar hosted about 234,000 people identi-

fying themselves as Chinese.

The new wave of Chinese migration to Myanmar began in the late 1980s, shortly after the military coup of September 1988, a date that can be regarded as a major factor in the emergence of a new wave of Chinese migrants as well as the acceleration of Myanmar-China ties. The cordial talks to establish Myanmar-China border trade on October 3, 1988, completed on December 1 of the same year, led to the open-border policy which facilitated cross-border business activities and the movement of people from both sides. The reopening of Chinese education, the approval of Chinese-language newspapers in Myanmar and, particularly, the re-establishment of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce that facilitated new business connections with Chinese investors across Southeast Asia, induced Chinese migrants, mostly from Yunnan, to pour into Myanmar in search of better prospects. According to Shannon and Farrelly (2014), the Chinese Embassy in Yangon estimated that by 2008, there were approximately 2.5 million Chinese living in Myanmar, the majority of whom had moved there in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Chinese traders have played a prominent role in turning Myanmar into a new market, brimming with cheap consumer goods made in China, while Chinese entrepreneurs have become "middlemen" between local consumers and Chinese suppliers. Chinese traders and vendors, mainly from border areas, migrated into Myanmar and made their living by importing and selling cheap Chinese goods to local people. A trade route quickly emerged from southern Yunnan, through the border town of Muse, down to the Chinese hub of Lashio in northwestern Shan State, and then on to Mandalay, the bustling heart of Myanmar (Shannon and Farrelly, 2014).

The close relationship between Myanmar and China has facilitated the expansion of economic relations, particularly bilateral trade through border towns in the two countries, and a massive inflow of Chinese investment which has brought Chinese migrants into Myanmar in its wake. On December 4, 1989, a Memorandum of Understanding for economic and trade cooperation between the two countries was signed during the visit to Yunnan by the Myanmar Ministry of Trade delegation. Under this MoU, Yunnan province would open department stores in Mandalay and Lashio, branch company offices would be opened and Yunnan commodities would be sold in Myanmar, and

tourism between Yangon and Kunming would be encouraged. All these business activities, together with the government's economic liberalization, helped to stimulate Chinese migration into Myanmar (Tun, 2015).

In contrast to the earlier movement of Chinese migrants to Myanmar, many of whom consisted of asylum seekers and down-at-heel citizens eager for resettlement, modern-day Chinese migrants are relatively affluent, with their sights firmly set on buying plots of land, establishing their own business, and engaging in investment projects and trading activities. Most of the gold and jewelry shops in central Mandalay are owned by Chinese or Myanmar-Chinese citizens. Large Chinese corporations and companies who have been awarded major development projects in Myanmar usually bring in their own employees from China, not just technicians but also unskilled laborers, the rationale being ease of communication.

Local people have expressed anxiety. In their view, Chinese investors have brought their wealth into Myanmar and then illegally invested in profitable sectors through Myanmar citizens descended from past generations of Chinese immigrants. In some cases, new Chinese migrants married local women to gain access to local networks, and then registered their businesses in their Burmese wives' names. This may explain why modern-day Chinese migrants make Mandalay their primary destination, where they can take advantage of established social networks created by long-term Chinese residents. Some new migrants have sought to obtain Myanmar citizenship by various means, including approaching officials and authorities through unofficial channels. Some long-standing Myanmar-Chinese settlers are dissatisfied with the new wave of migrants, because, in their words: "We are quite different from them in cultural traditions. Previous settlers pay respect to the native citizens, and live modestly, not in a pompous lifestyle. In contrast, new settlers do not care about the native people. Even they look down on us" (Tun, 2015).

Among the reasons for explaining how new Chinese migrants have been able to move to Myanmar in such large numbers since 1988, many locals believe that loose immigration rules and corrupt government officials are at the heart of the problem, with immigration officials in border towns known to issue Myanmar ID cards to Chinese migrants with relative ease. Some Chinese migrants pose as members

of a Myanmar ethnic minority such as Shan, Shan-Chinese, Wa or Kokang.

The arrival of illegal Chinese migrants has been a cause for concern among members of the Myanmar Parliament. In 2013, a proposal was discussed to weed out bogus new Chinese migrants by means of Burmese language tests. Apart from a formal talk and a new regulation for both Burmese and English to appear on advertising billboards instead of Chinese, no significant other steps have been taken.

In summary, since 1988 the movement of Chinese migration into Myanmar has been supported by good connections with open-door policy, in the absence of effective law enforcement, particularly in areas of cross-border migration between China and Myanmar. The economic liberalization and particularly the facilitation for Chinese capital flow for trade, investment and aid have provided opportunities for Chinese migrants to settle in Myanmar. As in other countries of the Mekong region, temporary Chinese migrants into Myanmar belong to different ethnic groups and places of origin, but the majority are Han Chinese from Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong. They are investors, middlemen, project managers, small traders and hawkers, as well as free- and contracted-laborers working in the fishery, mining and construction sectors or other heavy industry.

Vietnam

The population of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam prior to the 1979 China-Vietnam border war totaled 1.5 million, including 300,000 people located in the north of Vietnam (Khanh, 1994). During and after the 1979 war, approximately 300,000 people of Chinese descent left Vietnam for China, or migrated to a third country. According to data published by Vietnam's General Statistical Office (GSO), the Vietnamese-Chinese population in 1999 reached 862,071 (GSO, 1999). About 85 percent of ethnic Chinese live in the southern part of Vietnam. In Ho Chi Minh City alone the Chinese population is thought to be around 500,000.

Historically, Vietnam was a traditional destination for Chinese migrants. The most prominent feature of Chinese communities in Vietnam is their preference for communal living in specific areas, thereby giving rise to their own communities and facilitating business dealings. Vietnamese historical sources, including family records,

show that during the 16th to 18th centuries a number of Minh Huong villages were established along the coastal southern reaches of Vietnam—evidence of Chinese migrants seeking to integrate by settling in new lands.[14] Chợ Lớn (big market, or Chinatown), the most prosperous Chinese commercial center in the south, emerged in 1782.

The ethnic Chinese population played a significant role in southern Vietnam's economy until the post-1975 reforms. According to Khanh (1994: 41, 43, 56), during French colonial times, Chinese ventures accounted for 21 percent of total foreign investments in the south, falling to 16 percent during the Vietnam-American war, but still the top foreign investor in both periods. Early in the 1970s, approximately half of the enterprises in the south were owned by ethnic Chinese, who controlled most of the processing industries including rice mills, as well as export and import companies.

The new wave of Chinese migration to Vietnam started in the 1990s after the normalization of relations between two countries, and can be broadly categorized into four types. These are general categories and are not always clearly defined. The first are contract laborers brought into Vietnam by Chinese contractors and enterprises. The second are professionals, business people, students at educational institutions, and staff at Chinese representative offices in Vietnam. The third are independent migrants who assume the risks of making their way to Vietnam to engage in small or medium trading, or engage in business in various sectors such as services, street vending, restaurants and traditional herbal medicine. The final type is the daily cross-border circulation along the borderlands. While these four categories are helpful in identifying the specific groups of immigrants, it is important to see them not as separate movements but as a larger and interrelated human flow from China to Southeast Asia.

Aside from those previously recruited by Taiwanese companies, most Chinese workers have been brought in by Chinese contractors since the early 2000s. This form of labor migration is relatively new to Vietnam. The presence of Chinese immigrant workers in the Mekong region reveals the growing economic integration between China and the region. An unpublished MOLISA report (2010) indicates that the number of Chinese workers in Vietnam increased from 21,217 in 2005 to 75,000 in 2010 (3.5 times). These figures are, however, an estimate. Our investigation into nine actual work sites shows that

only 21 percent of Chinese workers are legally registered with the local authorities. Those who are not registered are probably not included in reports (Van Chinh, 2014).

Chinese manual workers are mainly employed in major construction projects granted to Chinese companies. The Chinese contractors interviewed during our fieldwork reported that most of their workers were employed under short-term contracts of 3-12 months or longer, depending on the project. A number of Chinese workers whom we spoke to, however, had overstayed their permits by one year or more. Some workers at the Hai Phong Thermo-Power Plant No. 1 had stayed in Vietnam more than five years, working at various projects across the country. Chinese employers usually move their workers from one worksite to another after 3-6 months in order to save on transaction costs. For instance, Chalieco Company (Chinalco Corporation) was contracted to build an aluminum processing factory in Tân Rai Bauxite Mining of Lâm Đồng. The Chinese contractor brought in 700 workers when the project began in 2008. The number of workers was then doubled to 1,400 in 2009 and decreased to 922 in late 2011. Most of the laborers working in Tân Rai were moved to Nhân Cơ aluminum factory in Dak Nong Province between 2011 and 2012, ostensibly on similar tasks. Such shifting of workers ensures the availability of labor for Chinese contractors and saves the latter from reporting to the local authorities of the presence of foreign workers.

The wages and work conditions of Chinese workers in Vietnam vary depending on the type of job and employer. As discussed earlier, most of the EPC projects managed by Chinese contractors were awarded at the government-to-government level, with conditions tied to concessional loans. As a result, Vietnamese investors are not in a position to influence the Chinese workers' salaries.

Chinese petty traders and workers also cross the border into Vietnam for informal trade. During our fieldwork, we observed that 90 per cent of the kiosks in Mong Cai Trade Center were rented to Chinese traders, most of whom cross over into Vietnam in the morning and return home to China in the afternoon. Interviews with people who live around the border gates reveal that cross-border human mobility benefitted both Vietnam and China, especially the local residents on both sides of the border. Data provided by Mong Cai border gate administration indicate that the volume of Chinese migrants into

Vietnam increased by 33 percent over 1996-2006, while the number of Vietnamese entering China rose approximately by 6 percent.

Cross-border farming is also popular among Chinese immigrants in Vietnam. Chinese immigrants lease land to plant cash crops and maintain aquaculture farms in Vietnam, with the produce shipped to China. It is difficult to obtain statistical data on seasonal migration from China to Vietnam, but mainstream media note that traditional, Chinese, small-scale cross-border cultivation can be found in many places in Vietnam. Along coastal Vietnam, there are also aquaculture farms run by Chinese owners under the names of their Vietnamese wives or relatives.

Chinese immigrants offering traditional Chinese medicine and healing services are also very popular in Vietnam. Statistics provided by the Ministry of Health indicate that in 2005-2011 the government licensed a total of 168 Chinese clinics for operation in Vietnam. Chinese clinics are now present in 17 provinces and cities. Most of them are concentrated in Hanoi (52 clinics), Ho Chi Minh City (32 clinics), Cần Thơ (19 clinics) and Đà Nẵng (13 clinics). Among the 684 Chinese staff working at 168 Chinese clinics, we found 158 doctors who graduated from Guangxi Institute of Chinese Traditional Medicine and the College of Vietnam Traditional Medicine.

Most Chinese healing practitioners have been working in Vietnam for several years but are still unable to speak Vietnamese and consequently must work through interpreters. Nevertheless, we did not meet professional interpreters in any medical clinic we visited. More often, we found Chinese-language college students, or medical staff who could command some Chinese, acting as interpreters. The Chinese practitioners running clinics continually bring in their family members as health care assistants to write out prescriptions or work as book-keepers.

Data from the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) show that bilateral trade between Vietnam and China in 2012 amounted to approximately $30 billion, of which about a third ($10 billion) was border trade. Chinese and Vietnamese petty traders operate through the three main border gates of Móng Cái, Tân Thanh and Hà Khẩu, with Chinese merchants having the dominant role. Their presence is widely felt from small villages in the mountains to large cities in the plains.

In general, Chinese merchants tend to employ trade strategies to maximize their benefit and minimize their tax liability, such as: cooperating with local petty traders to run agencies to collect the goods at the site of manufacturing, for onward transport to the border gates; paying in advance via intermediary agencies or by investing directly in farming households to manufacture the goods they want to buy, in order to keep the right to trade the products in which they have invested; and setting up agencies to collect products at commercial centers located at either border gates or borderlands and trade those products to China. By employing these practices, Chinese traders are able to buy almost all agricultural products available, including fruit, coffee, rice, sweet potato, cassava, seafood, rubber, and medicinal. They also collect small amounts of iron ore, coal and various other minerals mined by family-run businesses or private groups, to be shipped to China for high profit. At border markets, minerals are traded with the same ease that vegetables and other foodstuffs are bought and sold.

Unlike their forebears, new Chinese migrants to Vietnam do not seem to seek long-term settlement. With open policy of migration in China, the new Chinese migrants prefer using a combination of passport and visa for periods of stay, rather than applying for citizenship, even though many of them are not able to determine how long they will remain in the host country. Modern-day Chinese migrants will prolong their stay if conditions are favorable, but will leave for better possibilities in other places or return home to take advantage of new possibilities on the domestic market in China. As one Chinese petty merchant said, "Anywhere we can make money, we stay for long. If not, we go home."

As discussed earlier, China is a major provider of concessional loans to Vietnam and has won major construction projects in the Vietnamese engineering, procurement and construction sectors (EPC). By the end of 2009, Chinese companies were involved in development projects worth $15.4 billion, making Vietnam their largest EPC market in Southeast Asia. The increase in the number and value of EPC contracts won by Chinese contractors is one of the most important factors driving the increasing flow of Chinese contract labor migration into Vietnam (Van Chinh, 2014).

Conclusion

The opening up of China and its regional economic integration with the GMS has resulted in large waves of new Chinese migration to the region. Since the capital flows from China are expected to continue, the number of Chinese migrants will continue to increase and the Mekong countries will remain the preferred destination for this new movement. However, the new immigrants are not only motivated by employment and business opportunities but are also encouraged and facilitated by the Chinese government through a migration guarantee fund that gives loans to potential immigrants going abroad (Pieke and Speelman, 2013). New Chinese immigrants, together with the long-term ethnic Chinese residents in the region, represent the largest and most economically powerful immigrant group in GMS, supported and encouraged by the Chinese government.

How can we explain the new movement of Chinese migrants into the Mekong region and what could be the factors driving and influencing this movement?

Firstly, China's political relations with ASEAN in general and the Mekong countries in particular have improved. Since the 1978 economic reforms, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Thailand, normalization with Vietnam and strategic partnerships formed with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, China is no longer perceived as a communist threat but instead a friendly neighbor (although China's recent claims in the South China Sea have marred the relationship with Vietnam and with other ASEAN member states).[15] China's economic aid and concessional loans provided to this region, as well as the propaganda of "good neighbor" policy, also contribute to improving the image of China in the eyes of its neighbors.

Secondly, China's economic interactions with Mekong countries have expanded rapidly. Total bilateral trade increased more than 20 times in just 20 years. The transportation infrastructure along the economic corridor between China and the Mekong region has been improved. Inexpensive Chinese-made goods, ranging from large machines to daily necessities, can be easily transported to Mekong countries. Chinese traders supplying these goods appear to enjoy a degree of popularity among the local people. Small-scale Chinese vendors are spreading into many cities and towns in the CLMV countries.

Thirdly, Chinese migration is closely related to Chinese investment and contract projects. Chinese enterprises prefer to bring technicians and administrative staff as well as manual labor from the floating population in the Chinese mainland. This policy helps China to solve the problem of domestic unemployment. Furthermore, construction projects in these countries, contracted by Chinese, depend on Chinese technicians along with skilled and unskilled workers from the Chinese mainland. Chinese migrants in CLMV countries play an important role in China's exports, foreign aid and contract construction projects in the region.

Finally, these countries require coherent national immigration policies that take into consideration their social and economic development needs and interests. To better benefit from foreign workers in the region, and to avoid social problems, this national policy should address issues of the development of human resources, economic competitiveness, demographic transition, and industrial and social development. It is important to obtain accurate estimates of labor and vocational demand from different sectors.

New Chinese migration into the Mekong region is linked with China's investments, trade and economic aid. The immigrants are not only motivated by employment and business opportunities but also spurred by, and facilitated by, Chinese government policies. There is currently no mechanism among CLMV countries and China to ensure the legal status and interests of migrant workers. Steps are needed to institute a Memorandum of Understanding between each country and China on employment issues, and to establish a legal channel of recruitment for immigrant workers.

Notes

1 This paper draws from fieldwork conducted with the support of the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) program of the Nippon Foundation. The author is sincerely grateful to API staff at Bangkok office for its assistance during the fieldwork in the Mekong countries. He also cordially thanks Professor Supang Chantavanich, Dr. Pataya Ruenkaew at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, and unanimous reviewers and editors for their comments suggestions and corrections.

2 At an exchange rate of $1 = 35 baht, the 31,505. 7 million baht amounts to $900. 2 million.

3 In an EPC project, the contractor designs the installation, procures the neces-

sary materials and builds the project (either directly or by subcontracting part of the work). EPC is a prominent form of contracting agreement in the construction industry; http://www. epcengineer. com/definition/132/epc-engineering-procurement construction.

4 http://www. newworldencyclopedia. org/entry/Overseas_Chinese, accessed 14 July 2016.

5 http://data. worldbank. org/indicator/SP. POP. TOTL?locations=TH, accessed 12 July 2016.

6 "Floating population" or *liudongrenkou* in Chinese, describes a group of people in a given population for a certain period of time and, for various reasons, are not generally considered part of the official census as they no longer reside in the countryside but are not yet city dwellers. See Francesco Sisci and Lu Xiang (2003). Up to 2013, the number of floating people in China exceed 160 million. For more details see Armstrong (2013).

7 Also known as Chaozhou.

8 "Map of Cambodian Economic Development," Khmer Economy Magazine, March 1, 2012.

9 According to Nyíri Pál (2013), Chinese capital has also placed a premium on fluency in Chinese, which has contributed to a revival of Chinese education in the Kingdom. The largest Chinese school in Phnom Penh now has 13,000 students.

10 "Cambodia PM defends China-funded mega-dams at plant launch," *The Jakarta Post*, January 12, 2015, http://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/12/cambodia-pm-defends-china-funded-mega-dams-plant-launch. html (accessed July 15, 2016).

11 "As Oknha Ranks Grow, Honorific Loses Meaning,," *The Cambodia Daily*, June 21, 2014 (accessed July 9, 2016), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/as-oknha-ranks-grow-honorific-loses-meaning-62057/

12 Regulations of the Lao PDR allow Chinese citizens to travel to the northern Lao provinces of Oudomxay, Luang Namtha, Bokeo and Phongsaly for a period of ten days, extendable by a further ten days. On payment of a $25 fee, Chinese visitors can extend their stay to a three-month business visa. Alternatively, they can pay a yearly fee of $300 to obtain a 12-month resident's card for Laos. The cost of a tourist visa is $20 for 30 days and can be collected on arrival at the international checkpoint of Boten, a Lao town bordering Mohan in China.

13 Reports claimed that casino concessionaires were locking up visitors unable to pay off gambling debts, forcing Chinese officials from Hubei Province to travel to Laos to negotiate the release of these captive nationals ("The rise, fall and possible renewal of a town in Laos on China's border," *The New York Times*, July 6, 2016,http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/asia/china-laos-boten-gambling. html?_r=1).

14 The term "Minh Huong" (Ming loyalists) was used to refer to the refugees from the Ming Dynasty after the Qing takeover. Apart from the southern central coast, the Vietnamese Nguyen Dynasty also allowed them to settle in the Mekong Delta.

15 South China Sea dispute: Philippines says China has warned of 'confrontation', The Guardian, July 19, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/south-china-sea-dispute-philippines-says-china-has-warned-of-confrontation.

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

The Idea of Justice is a mesmerizing, non-fictional account of justice by the 1998 Nobel laureate Amartya Sen.[1] The distinguished Indian-born economist and philosopher offers a critique to his long-time Harvard colleague and interlocutor, John Rawls (1921-2002), author of *A Theory of Justice*. In his heady metaphysical overtones, Sen has distanced himself from the notion of *transcendental institutionalism* of justice, which he argued is obligated to one of the two divergent stands of the western political philosophers on justice. His analysis on various political, economic and social questions reinvigorates the idea of justice as a broader concept. Sen's approach focuses on the *comparative judgments* of what is "more" or "less" just, and on the comparative merits of the different societies that actually emerge from certain institutions and social interactions. In his own words "what is presented here is a theory of justice in a very broad sense. Its aim is to clarify how we can proceed to address questions of enhancing justice and removing injustice, rather than to offer resolutions of questions about the nature of perfect justice."

Sen provides two sets of discussion over 18 chapters. The first ten chapters deal with the ethical and political assessment of justice and injustice, which also answer queries on the role of rationality and reasonableness in understanding the demands of justice. Later, he describes the application of justice, with critical assessment of the grounds on which judgments about justice are based, which include freedoms, capabilities, resources, happiness and well-being, among others. Sen's explanation of justice is thought-provoking. According to Paula Newberg, it is "not a theory this time, but an exploration of

the ample dimensions of the field – is grand in the best sense of the word, taking on difficult subjects, and respectfully following centuries of philosophical debate while imaginatively rethinking them."[2] This is echoed by Samuel Freeman: "In *The Idea of Justice* Sen orchestrates his many contributions and achievements into a distinctive position on justice… How the current revival of political philosophy will influence future generations is impossible to predict. But it's a safe bet that the debates will be of world-historical importance, and that Sen's ideas about justice, social choice theory, and the capabilities approach to assessing well-being will make a crucial contribution to them."[3]

In his extremely powerful writing, Sen explains the issues surrounding justice with very simple references. For example, when recounting the story of the "three kids and a flute." In the story Anne says the flute should be given to her because she is the only one who knows how to play it. Bob says the flute should be handed to him as he is so poor he has no toys to play with. Carla says the flute is hers because it is the fruit of her own labor. After describing the story he poses the question: how do we decide between these three legitimate claims? The issue of institutional arrangement for ensuring justice cannot apply because there are no institutional arrangements that can help us resolve this dispute in a just manner. Conceptions of what constitutes a "just society" will not help us decide who should have the flute. A one-dimensional notion of reason is not much help either, for it does not provide us with a feasible method of arriving at a choice.

Sen argues that the imaginary *social contract theory*—which flourished during the Enlightenment and has been proposed by scholars from Hobbes to Kant and Rawls—is not sufficiently equipped to be functional to ensure justice, which he believes to be a pluralistic notion with many dimensions. Sen explains that the social contract, as a way of safeguarding agreement between citizens and society over rights and responsibilities, demands a singular ideal institutional setup, originated from abstract principles. He describes how the shortfall of *transcendentalism* remains with the quest for perfect standards of justice, regardless of the possibility of comprehending them in the distinctly non-ideal world of the here-and-now. He questions the mainstream approach to justice, including John Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness," by focusing on its inability to clarify the assessments of social realization (rather than merely on the appraisal of institutions and arrangements)

and comparative issues of enhancement of justice (rather than trying to identify perfectly just arrangements).

Sen advocates emphasis on *comparative* inquiries of enhancement of justice in the practical world as well as assessment of wide-ranging *social realizations*. He abets the "comparative social realization" on the "social choice theory," developed by Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-1794), the French philosopher and advocate of educational reform and women's rights. As it is the second stand of justice of the western political philosopher, some of the great names advocated for it, such as Adam Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx. Noting it as an alternative discourse, Sen explains how it was acceptable to share a common interest in making comparisons between different ways in which people's lives may be led, influenced by institutions but also by people's actual behavior, social interactions and other significant determinants. He argues that the notion of "social choice theory" is typically quite technical and largely mathematical, and many of the results in the field cannot be established except through fairly extensive mathematical reasoning; yet the approach and its underlying reasoning are quite close to the commonsense understanding of the nature of appropriate social decisions. However, Sen cautions against any superficial conflation of intellectual and geographic categories in explaining the notion. He noted the brilliant exchange of knowledge among the *intelligentsia* of various regions. As he amusingly observes, the ancient Greeks were involved in intellectual interactions with people from India, Iran and Egypt, but "seem to have taken little interest in chatting up the lively Goths and Visigoths." He notes that the approach developed in this book is on making evaluative comparisons over distinct social realizations by using "social choice theory."

At the source of Sen's work is an amazingly simple idea: "The role of unrestricted public reasoning is quite central to democratic politics in general and to the pursuit of social justice in particular." Undoubtedly, this is a significant view for a political process centered on human interaction as the essential component. Correspondingly, it is an interpretation for political pluralism as well as for profound disagreement about issues of public life.

Shekh Mohammad Altafur Rahman

Notes

1 In June 2008, Anand Panyarachun, one of Thailand's most respected figures, was invited to give the third in the Amartya Sen Lecture Series, delivered in Brussels on the topic of "sustainable democracy."

2 "What is justice?" by Paula Newberg, *The Globe and Mail*, October 23, 2009 (accessed March 21, 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/review-the-idea-of-justice-by-amartya-sen/article4291009/

3 "A new theory of justice," by Samuel Freeman, *New York Review of Books*, October 14, 2010.

Global Rectificatory Justice, by Göran Collste. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 207 pages.



Global Rectificatory Justice is a book on social and political philosophy by Göran Collste, professor of applied ethics at Linköping University, Sweden, and president of *Societas Ethica* (European Society for Research in Ethics). The book falls under the banner of "global justice," a field in applied and political ethics in which the author has conducted research for 25 years.

The book is "primarily the result of ethical analyses of views and arguments," the fruit of desktop research or the gathering of historical facts and background information from specific literature on ethics, history, economics and international relations. To collect information for this book, Collste travelled widely, including to South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Malaysia and China. Occasionally, he draws from his classroom and this transpires to full effect in some of his anecdotes, as when one of his Master's students remarked: "Everything Pakistani is today considered of less worth compared to the West: we consider our own history as shameful and we feel that we are still slaves under the British rulers."

Divided into 14 chapters, the book starts with a detailed introduc-

tion, followed by discussions on global justice, colonialism and claims for justice, rectification for slavery, the meaning of rectificatory justice after colonialism, ways forward, immigration policies in the context of colonial injustices, changing the global order and conclusions/implications.

Since present borders roughly coincide with historical borders between former colonial powers and their colonies, Collste explores the possibility of a connection between present inequality and the history of colonialism. In colonial times, the economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America were adjusted to suit the interests of the colonisers, with European superpowers prospering as a result, while decimating the resources of countries they had subjugated.

The publication is built around the premise that the present global order, from the economy to governance, "mirrors colonialism." It seeks answers to questions connected to the legacy of colonialism and its implications for a theory of global justice. It delves into the principle of rectificatory justice and what it requires to be enacted in practice. Prominent in the book is the notion that, since the historical colonial era still shapes the global order, there is a strong case for global rectificatory justice to assess and make amends for the legacy of colonialism. The form of the relationship has changed, but not the substance.

Collste makes laudable efforts to strike a balance between historical facts—local rulers courting colonial influence—and the ignominy of colonialism in all its guises. The argument of justice ensuing from colonialism is politically, historically and emotionally charged and demands analysis of countless facets of this historical event. Several of the arguments employ a clear premise based on the "do not harm principle," modelled on "non-maleficence," one of the four ethical canons advanced by T. Beauchamp and J. Childress in their *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* (2001), which have had far-reaching influence in medical ethics.

Colonialism is not confined to the physical occupation of a country. The damage to Beijing's Imperial Gardens, for instance, was caused by Britain and France storming the Old Summer Palace in 1860, when China sought independence, as Western powers occupied settlements and forced trading treaties with China. The French poet and dramatist Victor Hugo (1802-1885) depicted the sacking of the Summer Palace as a despicable act of vandalism at the hands of France and England,

the two "bandits responsible for the looting of a dream from the thousand and one nights, built with "marble, jade, bronze and porcelain,"[1] framed with cedar wood, covered with precious stones and draped in silk. On visiting the summer palaces, Collste's British travel companions felt discomfort and expressed remorse for their ancestors' actions in burning down numerous castles and mansions.

The section on global justice and the legacy of colonialism deals with five case studies: Uganda, Congo, Southwest Africa, Kenya and India. Collste makes a good case for the significance of these five former colonies, but he readily admits that local rulers conniving with European powers made influence from colonial powers less challenging from a moral viewpoint. Though these five countries receive substantial treatment throughout the book, other former colonies are mentioned to varying degrees. Malaysia, for instance, is discussed in relation to the multi-billion dollar claim lodged in 2007 by the descendants of Indians (HINDRAF or Hindu Rights Action Force) transported to Malaysia for "quasi-slave work during [British] colonial times." Upon independence from Britain in 1957, Hindus found themselves "unprotected and at the mercy of a majority Malay-Muslim government that has violated our rights as minority Indians."[2] Also in this region, Collste mentions the dissolution of the Indochinese Empire, with Vietnam engaged in a long, drawn-out struggle for independence from French imperialism and the ensuing war for reunification, which left hundreds of thousands dead.

Data collection has been supplemented by visits to museums in Europe, Africa and Asia, as well as to repositories of stories from the past and sources of information for what is *not* on display, "suggesting a hidden history that has not been narrated." Some of these journeys have renewed Collste's conviction that obligations for rectification are not extinguished by the passage of time, because they are trans-generational. For as long as there are identifiable beneficiaries and victims of past injustices in our times, "a trans-generational continuum of responsibility" will ensure that the deeds of our forefathers cause humiliation for our generation. In a situation probably familiar to many of us born in former colonizing countries, I recall only too well my overwhelming sense of shame for my ancestors' atrocities in Libya, which confronted me in 2006 during my first visit to the National Museum in Tripoli.[3] On display in the section on recent history, was

the hangman's noose used in 1931 by the Italian colonial government to execute Omar Mukhtar, a revolutionary who for twenty years had led resistance to Italian rule.[4]

Much food for thought is provided by detailed discussions of the different kinds of justice, such as distributive justice, backward-looking justice, compensatory justice, retributive justice and restorative justice. The latter has been tested in Australia (four tests) and the UK (eight tests) by diverting criminal or juvenile cases away from prosecution to restorative justice conferences (RJCs),[5] organized and led, for the most part, by specially-trained police officers. Developments were monitored over a period of 18 years for offenders and for up to 10 years for victims. Sherman et al., authors of this study, reported that RJCs "produced substantial short-term, and some long-term, benefits for both crime victims and their offenders, across a range of offense types and stages of the criminal justice processes on two continents, but with important moderator effects."[6]

By reference to the theories of "just compensation rule" and "categorization of claims for rectification," espoused respectively by Renée Hill and David Miller, Collste attempts to address the complex issue of rectificatory justice by asking a number of questions: who or which entity is responsible for rectifying colonial harms and what does this responsibility entail; is it anachronistic and/or fair to blame an entire nation for historical harms; is it fair to claim rectification from former colonizing nations today; what does rectification mean in practice; should there be statute of limitation with regard to rectification; and so on.

Conceptually, rectificatory justice is backward-looking, with a focus on the "correction for past deeds." Collste does not claim to have coined the term, which has been in existence at least since the 4th century BCE, when the Greek philosopher Aristotle wrote that the judge tries to equalize things between the injured party and the party inflicting the harm, by means of a penalty, by taking away from the gain of the assailant and instituting corrective justice as the mid-point between the loss and the gain, in order to restore equality

Faithful to the book's stated aims, it is the principles of rectificatory justice that are scrutinized: from the irrefutable but stern *dictum* that no innocent individuals need to rectify others' wrongs, to its connections with colonialism and the proposed amendments to individuals

and the rights of descendants. The principles in the book resonate with theories of justice proposed by numerous scholars, including Jeff Spinner-Halev, who argues that the emphasis should not be on compensation for past injustices but on the acceptance that some past injustices are still felt today. In connection with three acknowledged historical injustices involving respectively Armenians, Crimean Tatars and Chinese immigrants to the USA, Spinner-Halev argues that calls for the rectification of historical injustice do not satisfactorily deal with these three instances, because: "The Armenians do not want compensation but acknowledgement; the oppressors of the Tatars no longer exist; and it is unclear if and why Chinese Americans deserve compensation for the injustices their ancestors suffered, since Chinese Americans generally no longer suffer from these injustices."[7]

The author perceives the presence of "a moral obligation to compensate for the consequences of harmful acts," with the present unjust global structure deemed a legacy of colonialism. Compensation should not focus solely on reparation for past injustices but on the fact that some historical injustices are enduring to this day. As well as discussing the literature and theories from proponents advocating compensation for victims of colonial exploitation and atrocities, Collste also debates the work of authors who aver such claims. In this category we can include Jeremy Waldron, professor of law and philosophy, who disagrees with the concept of redressing historical injustices, on the basis that this process involves problematic counterfactual calculations. In discussing a recent case[8] about Maori fishing rights in his native New Zealand, Waldron mentions "formalism" as the occupational hazard of well-meaning people who use their best endeavors to find a way "of sustaining the business of historic reparations without regard to the human circumstances of those they claim to be benefitting."[9]

George Sher, another political scientist, questions the right to claim by descendants of victims of oppression and has advocated "a need for trade-offs among right violations or injustices if we wish to accept the framework of rights or justice at all."[10]

This book does an admirable job of providing a panoramic view of the extensive literature on an introspective examination of our collective past and atrocities committed by colonizing countries. It is a *tour de force* into the myriad of theories advocating justice for the dark

period of global colonialism and the painful scar of its consequences. It is a well-argued discussion on the emotive topic of colonialism and its legacy. The book also makes extensive references to the work of theorists such as John Rawls' eight principles for a Law of Peoples, to which Collste argues that a ninth should be added, of historical redress for international justice. Rawls' theory of "justice as fairness" is also discussed elsewhere in this volume (review of *The Idea of Justice*).

The overall thrust of the argument would have been strengthened by providing more than passing references on the possible reasons that have set former British colonies like Malaysia and Singapore on the path to first-world status, two notable exceptions in an otherwise long list of former colonies still relegated to developing status or even least developed country. One brief mention is, however, made when Collste admits that, though colonial occupation has been pernicious to entire continents, it has benefited a very small number of former colonies such as Malaysia, whose economy is reaping the benefits of the rubber plantations set up under British colonial rule.

Collste does not accept that historical injustices can lead to closure, unless and until the uncomfortable issue of rectificatory justice has been applied. In his view, the tragic consequences of European colonization are like an open wound that has been allowed to fester.

Lia Genovese

Notes

1 "The sack of the Summer Palace," letter of 25 November 1861 from Victor Hugo to Capt. Butler at Hauteville House in Guernsey (an island in the English Channel). It appears that Hugo wrote this letter in reply to an enquiry from Capt. Butler, who lived at Hauteville House, where Hugo lived in exile for 14 years. The Old Summer Palace was a vast complex of gardens and palaces, the largest and most luxurious of the royal gardens of the Qing Dynasty (r. 1644-1912).

2 Malaysiakini. 2007. Special Report: The HINDRAF protest, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/75315 (accessed 3 May 2016).

3 Also known as the Assaraya Alhamra Museum.

4 In 2008, Italy paid reparations of $5 billion (150 billion baht) for the atrocities inflicted on the Libyan population during 30 years of occupation. As part of the

negotiations, Italy also handed over to Libya the Venus of Cyrene, a Roman statue that Italian troops had removed in 1913 from a Greek-Roman settlement on the Libyan coast.

5 The UK's Crown Prosecution Service defines restorative justice as: "a process through which parties with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future" (http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/restorative_justice/). At a restorative justice conference, offenders face their victims and directly hear the impact of their actions.

6 Sherman et al. 2015 (un-numbered page in online journal).

7 Spinner-Halev 2003: 575. The Armenians suffered genocide in 1915 by Ottoman troops; Crimean Tatars were expelled from their homeland in Ukraine by Josef Stalin, when Ukraine did not exist as an independent country; Chinese immigrants to the USA suffered large-scale harassment during a wave of anti-Chinese agitation in the 1870s and 1880s.

8 Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission [2000] 1 NZLR 285.

9 Waldron 2003: 57.

10 Sher 1984: 212.

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